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Abstract
The purpose of this Thesis is to present a Bayesian analysis of oncological data sets
with particular focus on cervical carcinomas and ovarian cancers.
Bayesian methods of data analysis have a very long history, and have been used
with great success in many disciplines, from Physics to Econometrics. Nonetheless,
they remain very controversial among statisticians who belong to the orthodox -
i.e, frequentist school, and are not well known by the medical community. To help
in that direction, we reviewed in the introductory chapter the basic philosophical
and practical differences between the two schools, and in the second chapter, we
briefly reviewed the history of Bayesian methodology, from the early efforts of
Thomas Bayes and of Pierre Simon de Laplace to the modern contributions of
Harold Jeffreys, Richard Cox, and Edwin Jaynes.
In many aspects of medical research, we deal with experimental data from which
a certain proposition or hypothesis is validated. Unlike in physics, where we have
strong and solid foundations such as Newton’s law of motion, Snell’s optical laws,
Kirchoff’s laws, Einstein’s relativity theory, and many more, we do not have such
privileges in medical research. Hence, many hypotheses are constantly tested as
new evidence becomes available. One of the actively-researched medical areas is
cancer research about which our understanding is still in its infancy. Numerous
experiments (both in vivo and in vitro) and clinical trials have been conducted
to further our knowledge; thus, Bayesian methodology finds its place to aid us
in obtaining scientific inferences about certain propositions or hypotheses from
available data and resources.
In this work, we use data given to us by our medical collaborators at the Princess
Margaret Hospital (PMH) in Toronto to carry out two main projects: Firstly, to
make an inference about the oxygenation status (oxygen partial pressure, pO2)
within human cervical carcinomas and secondly, an inference about the effectiveness
of various molecularly-targeted agents (MTAs) in phase II clinical trials of relapsed
ovarian cancer patients.
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In the first problem, we address the challenges of tumor hypoxia - a state of
oxygen deprivation in tumors. Currently, there are two methods to obtain tumor
oxygen status, namely the direct Eppendorf needle electrode and the indirect im-
munohistochemical assay of a protein marker, Carbonic Anhydrase IX (CAIX). In
this project, we introduce Bayesian probability theory to obtain inferences about
tumor oxygenation from each technique and the concordance between the two tech-
niques. From this study, we conclude that under certain conditions, two biopsies
are sufficient to infer the tumor oxygenation level based on the immunohistochem-
ical assays of CAIX. Additionally, there is a fair concordance between the direct
and the indirect measurements of tumor oxygenation.
In the latter problem, ovarian cancer is the topic of study. Ovarian cancer has
the highest mortality rate among gynecological cancers and one that is known to
relapse. CA-125 is still the most inexpensive biomarker for monitoring ovarian can-
cers. From the phase II clinical trial data, we demonstrate the survival advantage
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This Thesis provides an account of Bayesian data analysis applied to oncological
research with particular focus on cervical carcinomas and ovarian cancers.
The data were obtained in a prospective study that evaluated hypoxia in patients
with cervix cancer treated at the Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH) in Toronto,
Canada. Patient selection criteria, measurements of tumor oxygenation, and tissue
handling were performed according to the methods described in the literature (Fyles
et al., 2002; Hedley et al., 2003; Iakovlev et al., 2007).
All living tissues need a certain amount of oxygen for the cells to function well,
and if its concentration has an optimum value the tissue is called oxic. However,
for various reasons some regions of the tissue may have a lower than normal con-
centration of oxygen; in that case, the tissue is said to be hypoxic. Obviously, the
oxygen is carried to the cells by the blood microcirculation, and since tumor cells
tend to be tightly packed together, tumor vasculature tends to be highly chaotic,
and it is very likely that there will be regions where cells do not receive adequate
oxygenation.
It has been known for a long time that oxygen concentration levels within a tu-
mor have a significant impact on the effectiveness of radiation therapy (Hall, 1994),
and it may also be the case that oxygen is “the most important determinant of
response [to radiotherapy] among tumors of the same type” (Harrison et al., 2002).
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In fact, it is considered an established fact among medical researchers that hypoxia
is “related to poor response to radiation and chemotherapy, genetic instability, se-
lection for resistance to apoptosis, and increased risk of invasion and metastasis”
(Fyles et al., 2002; Vaupel and Harrison, 2004), and more recent studies give further
confirmation of these findings (Vaupel and Mayer, 2007; Tatum et al., 2006).
Given this knowledge, it is quite understandable that the assessment of tumor
hypoxia has become a central concern of cancer researchers. The gold standard
of tumor hypoxia assessment is a direct measurement of pO2 (oxygen tension) in
vivo by the Eppendorf polarographic electrode (Fatt, 1976), which is an invasive
technique restricted to accessible biological sites and samples (∼ 100-150 points)
within the tumor. An attractive alternative is immunohistochemical assay (stain-
ing) to detect proteins expressed by cells during hypoxia. Carbonic anhydrase IX
(CAIX) is an enzyme expressed on the cell membrane during hypoxia in response
to balance the immediate extracellular microenvironment, and is widely regarded
as a surrogate marker of chronic hypoxia in various cancers (Loncaster et al., 2001;
Hoskin et al., 2003; Mseide et al., 2004; Olive et al., 2001; Hoogsteen et al., 2005).
The study conducted by the PMH group produced data on hypoxia assessment
by means of both the Eppendorf electrode and by CAIX staining, and have been
published along with a statistical analysis carried out with the well-established
techniques of conventional (orthodox) statistics (Fyles et al., 2002; Iakovlev et al.,
2007). Despite the use of quite sophisticated techniques, this analysis left practically
unresolved one of the most important objectives of the study, namely whether CAIX
staining can be used with confidence in assessing tumor hypoxia, thus making the
Eppendorf polarographic electrode obsolete.
It is, therefore, clearly of interest to re-analyze the data with a different method-
ology, such as the Bayesian approach taken in this Thesis. With the availability of
today’s powerful computers, Bayesian data analysis has become more and more at-
tractive to researchers in various disciplines. Thus, for example, this approach has
been popular in Econometrics (Zellner, 1971), in the analysis of Nuclear Magnetic
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Resonance (NMR) spectra (Bretthorst, 1988), in astrophysical studies (Gregory,
2005), in image processing (Sivia, 2006), and in many other areas. In medical
research, however, Bayesian methods are not yet widely used, though there are
clear signs of appreciation of its advantages and power (Berry, 2006, 2005), as well
as strong proponents of the Bayesian approach against the blind reliance on P-
values and hypothesis testing (Goodman, 1999, 2005; Goodman and Sladky, 2005).
Nonetheless, Bayesian methods are still considered non-orthodox and controver-
sial, and it is therefore important to have a clear grasp of why this controversy still
exists.
The fundamental difference between the two schools of thought rests on the
interpretation of probability. According to the conventional or orthodox school,
probability theory can only be applied to random variables. A classic example is
the number on the up face of a rolled fair die: Any of the integers 1, 2, ... , 6 can be
the outcome. When the die is rolled n times under the same conditions, the result
will be a sequence of n outcomes, possibly not all different, and if the order in which
the various outcomes occurred is not of interest, it is often convenient to summarize
such a data sequence in terms of relative frequencies of outcomes. Experiments of
this type have several possible outcomes, which are totally random in the sense
that it is impossible to say in advance which one will occur. However, experience
has shown that in many repetitions of the experiment the relative frequencies with
which the various outcomes occur will stabilize and tend to a fixed values. Although
it is impossible to predict which face will show up when the fair die is rolled just
once, we can say with some confidence that in a large number of rolls each face will
show up about 1
6
of the time.
From this point of view, probabilities are defined as the limiting values ap-
proached by relative frequencies as n →∞. The probability of an outcome is then
the fraction of the time that the outcome would occur in infinitely many repetitions
of the experiment. In other words, probabilities are approximated, or estimated, by
the corresponding relative frequency, and since the latter are measured it follows
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that probabilities are objective quantities like masses, lengths, temperatures, and
so on.
The restriction of probability to random variables poses serious problems in
data analysis. In most cases, scientists want to use data to make inferences about
the values of unknown parameters entering the model, or theory, which is sup-
posed to accurately describe the phenomenon under study. But these parameters
are constants, not random variables; hence, probability theory cannot be directly
applied to them. In order to cope with this problem, mathematicians created a new
subject – Statistics. To estimate a parameter, one must first relate it to the data
through a function of the data called a statistic; and since the data are subject to
noise, the statistic becomes the random variable to which the rules of probability
theory can be applied. This, of course, poses immediately another serious problem:
How should one choose the statistic ? Most of the last century saw statisticians
occupied with the solution of this problem. The masters, such as Fisher, Neyman,
and Pearson, created a variety of different principles, which in the hands of others
resulted in a plethora of tests and procedures without clear underlying rationale.
The Bayesian school of thought, on the other hand, sees probability in a com-
pletely different light. To pioneers like Bayes and above all Laplace, a probability
P (A|E) represented a degree-of-belief, or plausibility, of the truth of a proposi-
tion A given the evidence E at hand. Thus all probabilities are conditional, in
contrast to the frequentist interpretation where probabilities are absolute. To the
19th century scholars this seemed too vague and subjective an idea to be the basis
of a rigorous mathematical theory, and Laplace’s uses of probability theory were
scorned for over a century. (A brief review of the history of this conflict, up to the
present, is given in chapter two.)
A second point of contention between the two schools was Laplace’s use of
Bayes’ theorem as the main tool for making inductive inferences from the data and
the available prior information. Due to the fact that Bayesian probability is not
necessarily a frequency, but rather a measure of the plausibility of the truth of
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a proposition, this point of view allowed Laplace to solve scientific problems that
were beyond the capability of the frequentists, such as his famous estimate of the
mass of Saturn (which is recounted in chapter two). Thus Laplace was taking the
first steps toward the use of probability theory as generalized logic of science, as
spelled out by Edwin Jaynes in his recent book (Jaynes, 2003).
The most important contribution to this view of probability was given by
Richard Cox in the middle of the last century (Cox, 1946, 1961). Instead of getting
involved in the controversy about whether or not Laplace gave us the right “calculus
of inductive reasoning”, Cox took the constructive path of asking if such a calculus
is possible in the first place, and if so, whether or not there is a consistent set of
mathematical rules for carrying out plausible, rather than deductive, reasoning. He
started out with a few simple and common-sensical desiderata (axioms) on which
all reasonable people can agree. Firstly, given propositions A, B, and C, the plau-
sibilities of their truth within a context K must possess the transitive property : If
A is more plausible than B, and B is more plausible than C, then we must assert
that A is more plausible than C. To do otherwise would lead us to argue in cir-
cles. This can be simply accomplished by assigning a real number – in the interval
[0, 1] for convenience – to each proposition; the larger the number P (A|K) is, the
higher the plausibility that A is true. Of course, the interval endpoints represent
certainty, namely, P (A|K) = 0 means that A is false whereas P (A|K) = 1 means
that A is true. A second straightforward assumption is that once the plausibility
P (A|K) that A is true has been specified, the plausibility P (Ā|K) that A is false
is also specified automatically. Thirdly, if the plausibility P (B|K) that B is true is
specified, and then the plausibility that A is true given that B is true P (A|B, K)
is also specified, then the plausibility that both A and B are true P (AB|K) is also
automatically specified.
Cox did not prescribe the functional relations between the various plausibilities,
but only assumed their existence. Then, using Boolean algebra and the constraint of
consistency (in the sense that if two different methods of calculation are permitted
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by the rules, then they should yield the same result), he showed rigorously that
the consistency conditions take the form of two functional equations, whose general
solutions he found. Those solutions uniquely determine the two following rules:
P (A|K) + P (Ā|K) = 1, and P (AB|K) = P (A|B, K)×P (B|K). By mathematical
transformations one can, of course, change the form of these rules; but what Cox
proved is that any change of their content will produce inconsistencies, in the
sense that two methods of calculations, each permitted by the rules, will yield
different results. But the two rules above are just the sum and product rules of the
mathematical theory of probability, and all other equations needed for applications
can be derived from them. Therefore, the plausibility P (A|K) is nothing but the
probability that A is true given the context K. The proofs of all these results
are given in the references cited above, and a simplified modern version of them is
presented in Appendix B of (Sivia, 2006).
One thing missing from the outstanding work of Cox was a theory of how to
derive from fundamental logical principles the rules for assigning the prior probabil-
ities that are necessary to use Bayes’ theorem as the basic tool for making scientific
inferences. Fortunately, soon afterwards the seminal work of Shannon in informa-
tion theory and the realization by Jaynes of its relevance to the logical assignment of
priors, resulted in the Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) algorithm that put to rest the
main objections to Bayesian methodology. Their contributions – along with those
of Harold Jeffreys – are reviewed in chapter two, to which the reader is referred.
Chapter three gives a rather brief review of the principles of Bayesian inference,
with particular regard to parameter estimation and model selection. Then, in
chapter four, we begin with the applications of Bayesian methodology for inferring
tumor oxygenation status within human cervical carcinomas. This work has been
done in collaboration with Dr. Vladimir Iakovlev (at the Keenan Research Centre,
St. Michael’s Hospital) and Dr. Michael Milosevic (at the Radiation Medicine
Program, Princess Margaret Hospital). In chapter five, we introduce Bayesian
methods to infer the effectiveness of various molecularly-targeted agents (MTAs)
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from four phase II clinical trials of relapsed ovarian cancer patients. This project
has been done in collaboration with Dr. Amit Oza (of the Drug Development
Program, Princess Margaret Hospital). Finally, we conclude the Thesis with a
critical discussion of the results of the Bayesian analysis versus those of the orthodox




A brief history of Bayesian
methodology
It is convenient, for completeness’ sake, to start out with a brief historical review
of the developments of Bayesian methods of data analysis.
2.1 Bayes and Laplace
Traditionally, the starting point is associated with the paper of a British clergyman
(and amateur mathematician), Thomas Bayes (1763), but it was really Pierre Simon
de Laplace who gave impetus to the use of Bayes’ theorem as the ideal tool for
making inferences from a data set. In his famous memoir on the “probabilities
of causes” (Laplace, 1774), he had already pointed out the fundamental difference
between pure mathematics and scientific reasoning. The former relies on logical
deduction as the tool for making inferences, with the result that there is no room
for propositions of the type “This is probably the cause of that event”. The latter,
on the other hand, is concerned with the problem of inferring the probable cause
of an observed event or phenomenon, as schematically indicated in Figure 2.1, and
no certainty can ever be produced in this process. As already pointed out long ago
by Hume, no amount of observations of the sun rising in the East in the past can
8
Figure 2.1: Schematic process of deductive logic (top) versus inductive logic (bot-
tom)
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be used to deduce that it will rise in the East tomorrow as well. The best we can
do in Science is to learn from our past experience and infer from that and any new
data the most probable cause of the observed phenomenon.
The manner in which Laplace used probability theory for making inductive
inferences about causes is succinctly summarized by Edwin Jaynes (Jaynes, 1978)
as follows. Suppose E is an observable event which could result from a set (C1, C2,
... , CN) of conceivable causes. Suppose also that we have found, according to some
model, the “sampling distribution” or “direct” probabilities of E for each cause:
P (E|Ci), i = 1, 2, ..., N . Finally, assume that initially the possible causes Ci are
equally likely, i.e, assume a uniform prior distribution of Ci. Then, says Laplace,





which Laplace used with great success in solving many problems in astronomy,
meteorology, geodesy, population statistics, and more.
Later on, Laplace generalized (2.1) by noting that if initially the causes cannot
be considered equally likely, but have prior probabilities P (Ci|I), where I stands
for the prior information, then the terms in (2.1) should be weighted according to
these priors to give
P (Ci|E, I) =
P (E|Ci, I)P (Ci|I)∑N
k=1 P (E|Ck, I)P (Ck|I)
, (2.2)
which, following a long-established custom, is always referred to in the literature
as “Bayes’ theorem”.
Despite Laplace’s success in using (2.1), there were clear difficulties with this
approach. Firstly, in many practical problems, it is not possible to list a finite
number of causes in order to apply the so-called “principle of insufficient reason”.
This had already been noticed by James (Jakob) Bernoulli, who in his posthumously
published Ars Conjecturandi (1713) remarked that
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“ ... this may be done only in a very few cases and almost nowhere other
than in games of chance ... But what mortal will ever determine, for
example, the number of diseases – these and other such things depend
upon causes completely hidden from us –”.
Secondly, Laplace never derived (2.1) and (2.2) from fundamental logical principles,
but simply stated them as intuitive recipes, thus leaving room for doubt as to their
logical justification and uniqueness. Finally, Laplace was unable to tell how the
prior probabilities P (Ci|I) in (2.2) were to be assigned in a non-arbitrary manner,
leaving room for the critics to attack him on the grounds of non-objectivity, and
hence non-scientificity, of his results.
2.2 The frequentist reaction
In view of the great practical achievements by Laplace with (2.1), it would seem rea-
sonable to expect that the difficulties mentioned above should have stimulated the
next generation of statisticians to build constructively on the foundations laid down
by him; in particular, they should have focused their attention on seeking new and
more general principles for determining prior probabilities. Instead, what followed
was a concerted series of increasingly violent attacks on Laplace’s works, some of
which can be found in the works of Ellis (1842), Boole (1854), Venn (1866), and von
Mises (1928); they were so successful in their opposition that the Bayes/Laplace
uses of probability theory laid discredited for a century.
The objectives voiced by these writers were not directed against Bayes’ theo-
rem per se, for this theorem follows trivially from the product and sum rules of
probability theory, namely
P (AB|C) = P (A|BC)× P (B|C), (2.3)
and
P (A|B) + P (Ā|B) = 1, (2.4)
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where
• A, B, and C can be any event or proposition;
• AB|C denotes proposition A and B are both true given that proposition C
is true; and finally,
• Ā stands for proposition A is false.
Now by the product rule, we have
P (AB|C) = P (A|BC)× P (B|C),
P (BA|C) = P (B|AC)× P (A|C),
and, since P (AB|C) must equal P (BA|C), subtracting term by term gives
0 = P (A|BC)× P (B|C)− P (B|AC)× P (A|C),
or else
P (A|BC) = P (B|AC)× P (A|C)
P (B|C)
, provided P (B|C) > 0, (2.5)
which is just Bayes’ Theorem. As long as A, B, and C refer to random variables
and the probability is interpreted as frequency, as explained in the Introduction,
the orthodox statisticians have no objections to using (2.5). But that is not the
way Bayes/Laplace intended it. To see this, I can do no better than to follow the
explanation given by Sivia in his delightful introductory textbook (Sivia, 2006),
namely to read (2.5) as




• P (hypothesis|I) is referred to the ‘prior probability’; it is our state-of-knowledge
before we analyze the data or before we do any experiment regarding the hy-
pothesis at hand.
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• P (data|hypothesis, I) is the ‘direct probability’, also known as the ‘likelihood
function’. It is the implication of the hypothesis on the data.
• P (data|I) is the ‘evidence’. It only acts as a normalization constant in the pa-
rameter estimation case; however, it plays a crucial role in the model selection
case. This is the evidence representing the ‘merit’ of a particular hypothesis.
• P (hypothesis|data, I) is referred to the ‘posterior probability’; it represents
our updated state-of-knowledge in light of the new data.
Thus, in (2.6), we have a mathematical representation of the process of learning;
that is, of the scientific method. In the application of (2.5), one of the outstanding
successes of Laplace is recounted by Jaynes (Jaynes, 1985) as follows:
“For example – a famous example that Laplace actually did solve –
proposition A might be the statement that the unknown mass MS of
Saturn lies in a specified interval, B the data from observatories about
the mutual perturbations of Jupiter and Saturn, C the common sense
observation that MS cannot be so small that Saturn would lose its
rings; or so large that Saturn would disrupt the solar system. Laplace
reported that, from the data available up to the end of 18th Century,
Bayes’ theorem estimates MS to be (1/3512) of the solar mass, and
gives a probability of 0.99991, or odds of 11,000:1, that MS lies within
1% of that value. Another 150 years’ accumulation of data has raised
the estimate 0.63 percent.”
It goes without saying that this failed to impress the statisticians of the frequen-
tist school. In the first place, they pointed out, we cannot use probability theory
in estimating the mass of Saturn since it is a constant, not a random phenomenon;
hence, it cannot have a frequency distribution. In the frequency theory, one has
to imagine hypothetical ensembles of universes in which everything remains iden-
tical except the mass of Saturn. Then, one has to relate the mass of Saturn to
the observations through a function called a statistic. The data are obtained from
some experiments; hence, they are subject to measurement error, which is regarded
as ‘random noise’. As a consequence, the statistic becomes a random variable to
which the rules of probability can be applied. In the second place, they strongly
objected to the use of the prior, for if probability is just a measure of our state of
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knowledge then it cannot be objective, since different people will assign different
priors; therefore, objective (scientific) knowledge would not be possible to achieve.
2.3 Jeffreys and Cox
It was not until the middle of the 20th century that Laplace’s work in probability
theory was taken up and greatly expanded. In 1939, Harold Jeffreys published
his book entitled Theory of Probability, which saw several editions and reprints
(Jeffreys, 1958), and contained a strong defense of plausible, i.e, inductive reasoning,
as the true scientific method. Jeffreys pointed out that just as deduction must start
from axioms that must be accepted without proof, so induction must start from a
set of rules of reasoning that we cannot prove a priori but can only be justified
a posteriori. He then listed the following five rules that in his view are essential
(Jeffreys, 1958):
1. All hypotheses used must be explicitly stated and the conclusions must follow
from the hypotheses.
2. The theory must be self-consistent; that is, it must not be possible to derive
contradictory conclusions from the postulates and any given set of observa-
tional data.
3. Any rule given must be applicable in practice. A definition is useless unless
the thing defined can be recognized in terms of the definition when it occurs.
The existence of a thing or the estimate of a quantity must not involve an
impossible experiment.
4. The theory must provide explicitly for the possibility that inferences made
by it turn out to be wrong. A law may contain adjustable parameters, which
may be wrongly estimated, or the law itself may be afterwards found to
need modification – the relativity and quantum theories providing conspicuous
instances – and there is no conclusive reason to suppose that any of our present
laws are final. But we do accept inductive inference in some sense; we have
a certain amount of confidence that it will be right in any particular sense,
though this confidence does not amount to logical certainty.
5. The theory of induction must not deny any empirical proposition a priori;
any precisely stated empirical proposition must be formally capable of being
accepted in the sense of the last rule, given a moderate amount of relevant
evidence.
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In addition to the five essential rules, Jeffreys stated three more “useful guides”:
6. The number of postulates should be reduced to a minimum.
7. Although we do not regard the human mind as a perfect reasoner, we must
accept it as a useful one and the only one available. The theory need not
represent actual thought processes in detail but should agree with them in
outline.
8. In view of greater complexity of induction, we cannot hope to develop it more
thoroughly than deduction. We therefore take it as a rule that an objection
carries no weight if an analogous objection invalidates part of generally ac-
cepted pure mathematics.
Note that number six is essentially a statement of Ockham’s razor: the explanation
of any phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible, eliminating those
that make no difference in the observable predictions of the explanatory hypothesis
or theory. Furthermore, the seventh “useful guide” shows that a theory of in-
duction must agree with common sense in evaluating propositions about empirical
phenomena.
In addition to formulating rules for induction or plausible reasoning, Jeffreys at-
tempted to rebut the accusation of subjective prior assignment in Bayesian method-
ology. It is not at all arbitrary but required by logical consistency to represent a
state-of-knowledge before analyzing the data. Prior probability represents our ‘ig-
norance’ apriori. At any state of knowledge it is legitimate to ask about a given
proposition or hypothesis, ‘How do you know ?’ The answer will usually depend
on observational data. If we ask further, ‘What did you think of the proposition or
the hypothesis before you had these data ?’ we may be told of some less convincing
data. If we ask further questions, we shall reach a state where the answer must be:
‘I thought the matter worth considering, but had no opinion about whether it was
true’ (Jeffreys, 1958). In the event, when we do not have any information regarding
the value of a certain proposition or hypothesis, we can assign equal probabilities.
They are not in any way an assertion that they must occur equally often in any
‘random experiment’. As Jeffreys emphasized, taking a uniform or equal proba-
bilities prior is “not a statement of any belief about the actual composition of the
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world, nor is it an inference from previous experience; it is merely the formal way
of expressing ignorance” (Jeffreys, 1958).
No matter how reasonable Jeffreys’ rules appear to open-minded people, the
unfortunate fact is that he did not succeed in deriving them logically from any
compelling set of desiderata. The result was that the adherents of the frequency
school, i.e, the majority of mathematicians and scientists of the time, attacked
Jeffreys with the same acrimony as they had reserved for Laplace, and Bayesian
methodology kept being shunned for many more years.
This state of affairs did not change even after Richard Cox published what is
perhaps the most important work in the history of Bayesian Probability. In an
unpretentious little paper (Cox, 1946), he avoided getting involved in the debate
about whether or not it is appropriate to use probability as a measure of degree
of plausibility for the truth of a proposition, and focused instead on asking the
following question: Is it possible to construct a consistent set of mathematical
rules for carrying out plausible, rather than deductive, reasoning ? To find out, he
assumed the following desiderata:
1. Degrees of plausibility are represented by real numbers;
2. degrees of plausibility must be in qualitative correspondence with common
sense – i.e., with rationality; and finally,
3. if a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, then every possible
way must lead to the same result.
Then, using Boolean algebra, he proved that the consistency conditions took the
form of two functional equations whose general solution he was able to find. Those
solutions determined the rules (2.3) and (2.4) to within a change of variables that
can alter their form but not their content. This result was summarized by Jaynes
(Jaynes, 1985) as follows:
“So, thanks to Cox, it was now a theorem that any set of rules for
conducting inference, in which we represent degrees of plausibility by
real numbers, is necessarily either equivalent to the Laplace-Jeffreys
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rules, or inconsistent. The reason for their pragmatic success is then
pretty clear. Those who continued to oppose Bayesian methods after
1946 have been obliged to ignore not only the pragmatic success, but
also the theorem.”
2.4 Shannon and Jaynes
The full scope and generality of Bayesian inference had been already recognized
by Jeffreys, and Cox’s theorem legitimized what he had been doing all along. But
the main bone of contention with the frequentists, namely the alleged subjectivity
of Bayesian methods, was still at issue. In particular, there was still no logically
derived method to assign prior probabilities with scientific objectivity.
A breakthrough occurred soon after the appearance of the fundamental paper
The Mathematical Theory of Communication by Claude Shannon in 1948 (reprinted
in (Shannon, 1971)), which laid the foundations of the new field of Information
Theory. The communication system considered by Shannon consists of several
elements:
• An information source, which selects a message from a set of possible mes-
sages;
• A transmitter, which changes the message into a signal;
• A communication channel, such as a wire, which carries the signal; and
• A receiver, which changes the transmitted signal back into a message and
hands the message on to the destination.
The kind of questions which Shannon sought to answer were fundamental to
communication theory. First of all, he asked how we can measure the amount of
information. Secondly, how can information be coded efficiently and how can we
measure the channel capacity. Thirdly, and importantly, how do we handle the
noise which inevitably will try to corrupt the message. Finally, Shannon pointed
out that information should not be confused with meaning; in his words, “the
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering aspect.” Now
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in a communication process, we have N messages m1, m2, ... , mN from which we
are free to choose the one to be sent. Suppose we assign probabilities P1, P2, ... ,
PN to the messages; these probabilities are known, but that is all we know about
which message will be chosen. Then, asked Shannon, can we find a measure of how
much “choice” is involved in the selection of the message or of how uncertain we are
of the outcome ? (Shannon, 1971). Calling such a measure H(P1, P2, ..., PN) and
requiring it to obey some reasonable mathematical constraints, such as continuity
in the Pi’s and consistency, Shannon proved that the only such measure has the




Pi log Pi, (2.7)
where K is a positive constant. He then went on to stress that quantities of the
form H = −
∑N
i=1 Pi log Pi play a central role in information theory as measures
of information, choice, and uncertainty. Since this form is just the expression for
entropy in statistical mechanics, it will be called the entropy of the probability
distribution Pi.
Next Shannon considers the problem of encoding a message into binary digits
in the most efficient way. The most important step is to assign probabilities to each
conceivable message, which in general will not be possible. For example, he says,
“If a source can produce only one particular message its entropy is zero,
and no channel is required. For example, a computing machine set up
to calculate the successive digits of π produces a definite sequence with
no chance element. No channel is required to ‘transmit’ this to another
point. One could construct a second machine to compute the same
sequence at the point. However, this may be impractical. In such a case
we can choose to ignore some or all of the statistical knowledge we have
of the source. We might consider the digits of π to be a random sequence
in that we construct a system capable of sending any sequence of digits.
In a similar way we may choose to use some of our statistical knowledge
of English in constructing a code, but not all of it. In such a case we
consider the source with the maximum entropy subject to the statistical
conditions we wish to retain. The entropy of this source determines the
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channel capacity which is necessary and sufficient. In the π example
the only information retained is that all of the digits are chosen from
the set 0, 1, ... , 9. In the case of English one might wish to use the
statistical saving possible due to letter frequencies, but nothing else.
The maximum entropy source is then the first approximation to English
and its entropy determines the required channel capacity.” (Shannon,
1971)
Shannon does not show mathematically what this suggested calculation method
produces, nor does he discuss the interpretation of the probability distribution Pi,
but simply moves on to other matters.
It was Edwin Jaynes that realized the importance of Shannon’s suggestion to-
wards the solution of the old problem of assigning prior probabilities in the most
objective way possible. In his words,
“The great advance provided by information theory lies in the discov-
ery that there is a unique, unambiguous criterion for the ‘amount of
uncertainty’ represented by a discrete probability distribution, which
agrees with our intuitive notions that a broad distribution represents
more uncertainty than does a sharply peaked one, and satisfies all other
conditions which make it reasonable. ... It is now evident how to solve
our problem; in making inferences on the basis of partial information
we must use that probability distribution which has maximum entropy
subject to whatever is known. This is the only unbiased assignment we
can make; to use any other would amount to arbitrary assumption of
information which by hypothesis we do not have.” (Jaynes, 1985)
Furthermore, as already noted by Shannon, the entropy H is maximum when all
Pi’s are equal and no information is given except for the enumeration of all possible
outcomes. Thus, Jaynes pointed out that the Maximum Entropy Principle (Max-
Ent) contains as a particular case the principle of insufficient reason, but with the
following essential difference:
“The maximum entropy distribution may be asserted for the positive
reason that it is uniquely determined as the one which is maximally non-
committal with regard to missing information, instead of the negative
one that there was no reason to think otherwise. Thus, the concept of
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entropy supplies the missing criterion of choice which Laplace needed to
remove the apparent arbitrariness of the principle of insufficient reason,
and in addition it shows precisely how this principle is to be modified
in case there are reasons for ‘thinking otherwise’. ” (Jaynes, 1985).
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Chapter 3
The basics of Bayesian inference
Fundamental to Bayesian methodology is learning to revise a probability represent-
ing a degree-of-belief in the truth of a certain proposition in light of new information
or empirical data through Bayes’ theorem. This process is also referred to as the
principle of inverse probability and is schematically illustrated in Fig. 3.1. As
explained in the introduction chapter of this Thesis, probability is defined as a
degree-of-belief or plausibility of truth of a certain proposition, and probability is
always conditional on our background information. As should be clear from Fig.
3.1, Bayesian reasoning is a gradual learning process.
The two aspects of Bayesian analysis that are reviewed here are those of pa-
Figure 3.1: The process of revising probabilities. Redrawn from (Zellner, 1971)
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rameter estimation and model selection. The former is the simplest to explain;
therefore, we will begin with the application of Bayesian methods in estimating a
parameter. The latter is important when one wants to compare various hypotheses
or propositions about a certain phenomenon.
3.1 Parameter estimation
Consider for a illustration purposes that we are concerned about a parameter θ,
which is assumed to be a continuous variable in a finite interval. Following the
scheme in Fig. 3.1, we begin the Bayesian analysis by quantifying our knowledge
about θ through the prior probability. We may be aware of a plausible value of
θ from previous experience, either theoretically or experimentally. If not, we shall
not despair. We can use a prior probability that represents total ignorance, namely
P (θ|I) =
 1[θmax−θmin] , for θmin ≤ θ ≤ θmax0 otherwise, (3.1)
where θmax and θmin are the minimum and the maximum value for θ respectively. In
any physical application, the parameter θ is bound either by theoretical or practical
limits. This type of prior probabilities is also known as the flat prior. It basically
states that we do not know which particular values of θ are more plausible; equiv-
alently, it assigns equal probability to all values that θ can take. Note, however,
that this does not mean that those values must occur equally often in any “random
experiment”, as the frequentists would have it; rather, as emphasized by Jeffreys,
it is only a formal way of saying “I don’t know”
Next we must calculate the likelihood function, P (D|θ, I), which is basically the
implication of our model of f(θi) on the data (D). We can model the data di in
general as
di = f(θi) + εi, i = 1, 2, ..., N (3.2)
where εi is the error parameters, commonly referred to as noise, and f(θi) represents
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the functional form of the model. For clarity purposes, let us assume that we have
a constant model f(θi) = θ (∀i) for the data,
di = θ + εi; (3.3)
in scientific experiments, the data may be thought of consisting a constant signal θ
and a noise εi. In Bayesian probability theory, one need not make assumption about
the sampling distribution of the noise; rather, one assigns what is actually known
about the noise. In other words, we assign to the noise a prior distribution which is
consistent with what is known about it. This prior should be as uninformative as
possible, as a precaution against “seeing” things in the data which are not there.
It can be shown by means of the Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) principle that the
least informative prior probability of the errors εi is given by (Bretthorst, 1988),











where s2i is the second moment of the noise. Now from Eq. 3.3 we may write
the error, which is the difference between the assumed model (f(θi) = θ) and the
actual data (di), in the form ε
2
i = (θ − di)2, and so the direct probability that we
should obtain the data D = {d1, d2, ..., dN}, given the parameters, will give us the
likelihood function (proportional to the direct probability) as
















is the mismatch between the data di and the model θ. Assum-
ing that each datum is independent, we have



















Then the application of Bayes’ theorem gives us our new knowledge about the
parameter θ in light of the data encapsulated in a posterior probability density
function (pdf),
P (θ|D, I) = P (D|θ, I) P (θ|I)
P (D|I)
. (3.7)
Since this is a parameter estimation case, we may absorb the evidence, P (D|I),
into the normalization constant, resulting in





























from which the best estimate of θ is found by maximizing this probability density





= 0 , (3.9)
where θ̂ represents the desired maximum, along with a negative second derivative.
In most cases, it is much simpler to deal with the (natural) logarithm of the pdf
(Sivia, 2006),





Expanding about its maximum θ = θ̂ and ignoring terms higher than quadratic,
we obtain an approximation for the pdf,











where A is a normalization constant. We therefore approximate the posterior pdf
with the well-known Gaussian distribution.
The simplest case is when all the error-bars can be taken to be equal - i.e, when
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s1 = s2 = ... = s. Then Eq. 3.11 can be written as

















. The posterior pdf thus has
the classical bell-shaped form and the uncertainty can be represented by the full
width at half maximum (FWHM). For a Gaussian pdf, it can be shown easily that
the FWHM is 2×
√
2 ln 2σ ≈ 2.35σ (Sivia, 2006). In such a case, we can summarize
the result of our inference by the expression
θ = θ̂ ± σ. (3.13)
In general, however, it may not be possible to encapsulate the best estimate
from the posterior pdf in two simple numbers such as θ̂ and s. For an asymmetric
pdf, it is not appropriate to use the FWHM of the posterior pdf to quantify the
uncertainty of the estimate; however, we may utilize a credibility interval to express
our uncertainty, namely
P (θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2|D, I) =
∫ θ2
θ1
P (θ|D, I) dθ ≈ 1− α, (3.14)
where θ2 − θ1 is as small as possible. The region θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2 is called the shortest
1−α credibility interval, where α is usually taken as 0.05. We can then proceed with
the Lagrange’s optimization technique to find θ1 and θ2, by solving the straight-
forward problem:




P (θ|D, I) dθ = 1− α. (3.15)
For a multimodal pdf which has one peak that is relatively much higher the others,
we may neglect the smaller peaks. However, if we have more than one peaks
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that have relatively the same height, we cannot use only one number for the best
estimate of the parameter. Hence, the most honest thing we can do in that case is
just displaying the posterior pdf itself (Sivia, 2006).
So far we have assumed that the error-bars are known. But very frequently
they are not, so that the simplest case is when we have to deal with two unknown
parameters, θ and s. Our posterior pdf is then the joint pdf, P (θ, s|D, I), and we
still would like to get the best estimate of θ. This situation poses great difficulties
to the frequentist school, and that is the reason why orthodox statisticians refer
to parameter like s as nuisance parameters. In the Bayesian approach, nuisance
parameters pose no problem, for all we have to do is using marginalization,
P (θ|D, I) =
∫
s
P (θ, s|D, I)ds, (3.16)
where the integral is over the whole range of s. With the application of Bayes’
theorem and the product rule to the integrand, we obtain
P (θ|D, I) ∝
∫
s




P (D|θ, s, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eq. 3.6
P (θ|s, I) P (s|I)ds. (3.17)
We may use the assumption of independence for each datum and between the data
and the error-bar; thus, P (θ|I) = P (θ|s, I). For the prior probabilities, we use the
flat prior for P (θ|I); however, since s is a scale parameter, we shall use the Jeffrey’s
prior for the error parameter (Jeffreys, 1958),
P (s|I) =
 1s , for 0 < s < ∞0 otherwise. . (3.18)
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As a result, the posterior pdf becomes




















where the integration is easily evaluated by a change of variable t = 1
s
and A is the
normalization constant. The posterior pdf in Eq. 3.19 has a Student-t distribution
as opposed to Gaussian distribution. The best estimate of θ and its uncertainty
can be obtained by following the same procedures as in the previous case.
In general, if we have more than one parameters to be estimated ~θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θk),
the above derivation extends naturally; we will have a joint posterior pdf instead
of single variable posterior pdf,









if the si are known. If they are unknown, we have
P (~θ|D, I) ∝ 1(∑N




In both cases, we will have a posterior hyper-surface rather than a posterior curve.
For illustration purposes, interested readers are encouraged to visit chapter three
of (Sivia, 2006) in which a straight-line fitting example is presented. Furthermore,
for curious readers, a paper by Stephen Gull entitled “Bayesian data analysis -
Straight line fitting” (Gull, 1988) is a good starting point for the case where both









Table 3.1: Adapted from (Hamilton, 1964)
3.2 An example from theoretical chemistry
As a simple example of application of the theory reviewed in the previous section,
consider the following scientific problem. Crystallographic techniques have been
used to measure the length of the bond between an atom of Phosphor and an atom
of Carbon in a certain molecule ((PC3)4). Six measurements have been performed,
and the results are displayed in Tab. 3.1.
In Bayesian reasoning, we ask ourselves what the plausible value of the P-C
bond length is in light of these six observations. Let us denote by µ the estimate
for the P-C bond length, which is a constant. We want to obtain P (µ|data, I).
Thanks to Bayes’ theorem, we can write
P (µ|data, I) ∝ P (data|µ, I) P (µ|I), (3.22)
and since this is a parameter estimation case, we absorb P (data|I) into the normal-
ization constant. For the prior probability, we shall assign a uniform prior because
we have no reason to believe any particular value is more preferable than others.
The most honest way to assign the prior probability is
P (µ|I) =
 1[µmax−µmin] , for µmin ≤ µ ≤ µmax0 otherwise. . (3.23)
For the likelihood function formulation, we need to look at the implication of
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the constant model. We can model the data as
xi = µ + εi, (i = 1, 2, ..., 6), (3.24)
where εi is the noise. Since the errors follow a Gaussian distribution, we have,










Assuming that each observation is independent, the likelihood function is simplified
into
















The posterior density function (pdf) is essentially the product of the likelihood
function (Eq. 3.26) and the prior probability (Eq. 3.23); thus,










where all the constants are absorbed into C, which is determined so that the area
under the curve is unity. Following the procedures explained in the previous section
on data with known error-bars, we obtain the following estimate
µ̂ = 1.853± 0.0017, (3.28)
for the most plausible P-C bond length based on the six observations. Had we
not known the uncertainties or error-bars on each observation, we could have used
marginalization as shown in previous section on data with unknown error-bars. The
estimate for the most probable P-C bond length is then
µ̂ = 1.861± 0.013. (3.29)
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Fig. 3.2 illustrates the posterior probability density for each case.
It is important to keep in mind that the estimate µ̂ is nothing more than the
most plausible value in light of these six measurements and our prior information.
As it is evident from Fig. 3.2 the full width at half maximum (FWHM) represents
the reliability of our estimate. As a result, it is appropriate to summarize our
estimate in the form (most plausible value ± something) as long as the resulting
posterior pdf is symmetric and unimodal.
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Figure 3.2: The posterior probability density function as a result of known (left)
and unknown (right) error-bars respectively.
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3.3 Model Selection
The assumed form of the model f(θi) in Section 3.1 was simply a constant. In many
other situations, however, we might be interested in inferring whether the model
should be a linear, or a quadratic, or an even more complicated function. Choosing
a model in cases when there is uncertainty as to which one of a set of alternative
models is most suitable is called model selection.
Confronted with this problem, we might think of choosing the model on the basis
of how well the alternatives fit the data. However, this thought is naive because
models with more adjustable parameters, of which they may be infinitely many,
will always fit the data better. Still, most people would prefer the model with the
fewest possible parameters, as the main goal of science is to explain the observed
phenomena with the simplest possible theory.
To explain how the decision is made within the Bayesian framework, it is best
to repeat the elementary formulation (originally due to Jeffreys (Jeffreys, 1958))
presented in chapter four of Sivia (Sivia, 2006). Suppose that in a graph-fitting
context we formulate two models:
• M1 – The noisy measurements of y versus x are described by y = 0;
• M2 – The same measurements are described by y = c, with c an adjustable
parameter.
Which is more plausible on the basis of data D ? In the Bayesian framework,
we quantify the merit of the two theories based on each posterior probability,






if the posterior ratio is greater than one (in order of magnitude) then the theory M1
is more plausible than that of M2. If the posterior ratio is less than one then M2
is more plausible. Finally, if the posterior ratio is approximately of order one, then
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the current data is insufficient to make an informed judgement. Applying Bayes’





P (M2|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior ratio
, (3.31)
where the evidence P (D|I) cancels out. Probability theory tells us that the merit
of the two theories depends partly on what each individual knows prior to the
analysis of the data. If we assign the prior ratio to be unity, representing fairness,
the posterior ratio becomes the ratio of the likelihood functions, and to assign
the latter, we need to be able to compare the data with the predictions of M1
and M2: The larger the mismatch, the lower the corresponding probability. The
calculation for M1 is straight-forward, but the one for M2 is complicated by the
fact that the parameter c is unknown. This is a clear example of the usefulness of
marginalization, for we can write
P (D|M2, I) =
∫
c-range




P (D|c, M2, I)P (c|M2, I)dc, (3.32)
where in the second step we just applied the product rule. The first factor under
the integral is the ordinary likelihood function (on a par with P (D|M1, I)) with the
value of c given. The second factor, on the other hand, is M2’s prior probability
for c. Hence, it is the duty of the theorist to articulate his state-of-knowledge, or
ignorance, before seeing the data. We will illustrate how this idea can be developed
in the application presented in the next section.
3.4 Another example from theoretical chemistry
Consider a set of data representing the natural rubber content in mixture of nat-
ural and synthetic rubber obtained by infrared spectroscopy (Mandel, 1984). The
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Table 3.2: The experiments on the mixture of natural and synthetic rubber (xi)
and the natural rubber content (yi)
experimental results are tabulated in Tab. 3.2 and plotted in Fig. 3.3. From the
experimental data, we want to infer which model is more plausible: a linear or a
quadratic model.
The two propositions of interests are H1 and H2, where respectively,
1. H1 is a proposition of a linear model: y
(1)
i = a1 + b1xi + εi, and
2. H2 is a proposition of a quadratic model: y
(2)
i = a2 + b2xi + c2x
2
i + εi,
where i = 1, ..., 6 and εi denotes the measurement error (noise) for the i
th datum.
In the first model H1, we have two adjustable parameters (a1 and b1); whereas,
in H2, we have three adjustable parameters (a2, b2, and c2). We begin with the
posterior pdf for each proposition through Bayes’ theorem,
P (Hk|D, I) =
P (D|Hk, I) P (Hk|I)
P (D|I)
, (3.33)
where k = 1, 2 denoting each proposition. The denominator in Eq. 3.33 cancels





P (H2|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior ratio
. (3.34)







Figure 3.3: The scatter-plot of the experiments
Thus, we need to compare the data in light of each proposition H1 and H2; the
larger the mismatch the smaller the probability.
We cannot directly compare the data with each of the propositions because
each proposition contains adjustable parameters which are unknown. As it was
explained earlier, the measurement errors follow a Gaussian distribution with an
unknown variance, s. Thus, we have three unknowns for H1 and four unknowns
for H2. Instead of estimating each unknown which is not our concern in evaluating
the merit of a proposition, we may use marginalization available to us; therefore,
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for H1,























P (D|a1, b1, s, H1, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood




where we applied consecutive product rules. In general, we need not find the es-
timates for each parameter; however, as we see later, in order to find analytically
tractable solution, we may need to do so. It is reasonable to assume that the ad-
justable parameters are independent of the variance of the noise, so that ∗ becomes
simply P (a1, b1|H1, I), which is the joint prior for parameter a1 and b1. P (s|H1, I)
is just the prior for the standard deviation of the noise. The limits of integration for
each adjustable parameter are determined by its range of possible values. Since we
have no prior information about the plausibility of the values for each parameter,
we then assign a flat prior for each adjustable parameter,
P (ai|I) =
 14ai , for amini ≤ ai ≤ amaxi0 otherwise. , (3.37)
where 4ai = amaxi −amini , i = 1, 2, and similarly for the adjustable parameter b and
c. For the scale parameter s, we assign the Jeffrey’s prior,
P (s|I) =
 1s , for s ∈ (0,∞)0 otherwise. . (3.38)
For each likelihood, we assume independent, additive, Gaussian noise; as a result,
the inner most integration due to the marginalization of the variance of the noise
converges as s → ∞, giving a Student-t distribution or also known as Cauchy
distribution (Section 3.2). Similar procedures apply for H2 but we have one more
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integral due to the additional adjustable parameter c2. The odds ratio now becomes,
after some simplifications,
O12 =
4a2 4 b2 4 c2

























i3 da2db2dc2 . (3.39)
We then may proceed either analytically by approximating the likelihood func-
tion or numerically by computing the multi-dimensional integrals. The latter can
be done by using a Monte Carlo integration; since we only have up to three dimen-
sional integration, a crude Monte Carlo method still suffices. For higher dimensions
however, it may be more efficient to use importance sampling. The former approach
is better in a sense that it is analytically tractable. We outline this approach briefly.
If the joint prior for the adjustable parameters does not cut off too much of the in-
tegrand P (D|a1, b1, s, H1, I) - i.e, if most of the distribution falls into the rectangle
[amin1 , a
max
2 ]× [bmin1 , bmax2 ] - then we can make the approximation:













where â1 and b̂1 are the best estimate for each adjustable parameter in H1 and
δa1 and δb1 are the uncertainty of the estimates. We can generalize Eq. 3.40 by
including the correlation term; however, for illustration purposes, we ignore the
correlation between a1 and b1. The best estimates, along with their uncertainties,
can be obtained by following the parameter estimation method explained in Section
3.1. The parameter estimates are tabulated in Tab. 3.3. Substituting Eq. 3.40,
along with its respective prior probabilities, into Eq. 3.36, and evaluating the
integral respectively, we obtain
P (D|H1, I) ∝
1[∑6




]3 δa1δb14a1 4 b1 ; (3.41)













Table 3.3: The best estimates, along with their uncertainties, of each proposition.
posterior ratio O12 becomes
O12 =
likelihood ratio︷ ︸︸ ︷[∑6
















where the prior ranges for each parameter are taken as follows
• ai ∈ [0, 100]; when we do not have any rubber in the mixture, the probability
of the rubber content is zero. The maximum value however can be as large
as possible (for simplicity, we set the maximum to be 100),
• bi ∈ [0, 100]; the argument is that the more rubber we have in the mixture,
the rubber content shall increase, therefore, this eliminates the possibility of
negative slopes,
• c2 ∈ [−100, 100]; this however can be negative since we can also have a nega-
tive concavity when we have a positive slope.
where i = 1, 2. We keep in mind that in determining of possible ranges for each
parameter, we should be as uninformative as possible unless we have had experience
with similar experiments before. Additionally, we should not be influenced with
the scatter-plot of the current data since, by definition, prior probability is assigned
before we look at the current data.
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The latter approach can be done easily with a Monte Carlo integration (see
Appendix A, for a brief overview of Monte Carlo integration), leading to the same
conclusion which is in favor of the linear model. Evidently, the likelihood ratio
prefers the more complicated model; whereas, the Ockham’s factor punishes the
more complicated model because of its additional parameter. Thus, based on the
experimental data and our prior knowledge, we conclude that the most plausible
proposition is the linear one as opposed to the quadratic one.
In the next chapter, we begin applying Bayesian methods to cancer research
problems, namely tumor hypoxia inference in cervical carcinomas and clinical trials’
data analysis in relapsed ovarian cancers.
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Chapter 4
Bayesian analysis of tumor
hypoxia data
In this chapter, we present the results of the assessment of tumor hypoxia by using
Bayesian methods to analyze the data generated by the PMH group by means of
both direct oxygen partial pressure (pO2) measurements in vivo and immunohis-
tochemical assays of an intrinsic protein marker, namely Carbonic Anhydrase IX
(CAIX). Additionally, we analyze whether or not the two tumor hypoxia quantifi-
cations are in concordance with each other. First, however, a description of tumor
hypoxia, more detailed than the one given in the Introduction is in order.
4.1 Tumor hypoxia
Hypoxia is defined as a state of oxygen deficiency. It occurs in an early stage of
tumor growth when tumor cells depend on the diffusion of oxygen from nearby
blood vessels. At this stage, the tumor is said to be in an avascular stage. Some
examples of avascular tumors include carcinomas, lymphomas, and sarcomas. A
vascular tumor, on the other hand, is a matured one. It does not depend on
the diffusion of oxygen any longer because it has already completed angiogenesis,
which is the formation of new blood vessels. Thus, a vascular tumor tends to be
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aggressive because it has its own supply of nutrients; moreover, tumor cells are
capable of entering blood vessels and traveling to distant sites, forming metastasis.
A more precise definition of tumor hypoxia is a state of a decreased dissolved
oxygen concentration (pO2) below a critical level (Hckel and Vaupel, 2001). The
definite critical oxygen level is still debatable. Nevertheless, many agree that if
the tissue oxygen level falls below 10 mmHg, the particular tissue is considered
hypoxic (Hckel and Vaupel, 2001; Milosevic et al., 2004). Based on the causes at
tissue level, tumor hypoxia can be classified into three different groups, known as
radiobiological hypoxia (Raleigh et al., 1996; Horsman, 1998).
The first type of radiobiological hypoxia is a chronic (diffusion-limited) hypoxia.
Thomlinson and Gray demonstrated that tumor cells that are beyond 150 µm of
nearby blood vessels become starved of oxygen and die, forming necrosis (Hall,
1994; Dewhirst, 1998; Vaupel and Harrison, 2004). Additionally, diffusion-limited
hypoxia may also be caused by the deterioration of diffusion “geometry”, for ex-
ample, concurrent versus countercurrent blood flow within the tumor microvessel
network (Vaupel and Harrison, 2004). The second type is acute or perfusion-limited
hypoxia which is transient in nature (Hall, 1994; Dewhirst, 1998; Vaupel and Har-
rison, 2004). This type of hypoxia is usually present in the stroma of solid tumors.
Perfusion-limited hypoxia is caused by inadequate blood flow in tissues due to severe
structural and functional abnormalities in tumor blood flows (Vaupel and Harrison,
2004). Tumor microvessels are widely known to be dilated, tortuous, elongated, and
saccular; moreover, they often collapse and cause transient blockages in the flow of
oxygen (Hckel and Vaupel, 2001). Once the blockages disappear, oxygen is able to
flow to reoxygenate the tumor area. The third type of tumor hypoxia is an anemic
hypoxia. It is caused by a reduced O2 transport capacity of the blood subsequent
to tumor-associated or therapy-induced anemia (Vaupel and Harrison, 2004).
The three types of tumor hypoxia mentioned earlier are the ones that are im-
portant for tumors. With the exception of anemic hypoxia, both chronic and acute
hypoxia have been widely demonstrated to be crucially important for cancer treat-
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ment (Raleigh et al., 1996; Horsman, 1998). Nevertheless, there has not been any
success in distinguishing between the two types of tumor hypoxia. Sequential imag-
ing may provide some clues whether or not tumor hypoxia is acute; however, not
all tumor sites are accessible by imaging techniques. Additionally, tumor vascula-
ture is uncontrollably chaotic. Tumor microvessels are leaky, tortuous, elongated;
moreover, they have incomplete endothelial linings and an increased vascular per-
meability. (For a more complete review regarding tumor vasculature and its effects
on radiotherapy, the reader is kindly directed to (Vaupel, 2004).) This provides
another challenge in determining the cause of tumor hypoxia. There are numerous
factors affecting tumor hypoxia: to name a few, the host tissue of the tumor, the
type of the tumor, and the grade of the tumor. These factors make the modeling
of tumor hypoxia very challenging.
4.2 Tumor hypoxia measurements
Many studies of tumor hypoxia was based on direct pO2 measurements using a
polarographic oxygen electrode. A commonly used commercial system is the Ep-
pendorf needle probe with an outer diameter of 300µm and a tip diameter of 120µm.
The electrode is inserted into the tissue in steps of 1.0 mm; each is followed by a
backward motion of 0.3 mm (Fyles et al., 2002). The inserted tip of the electrode
is covered with teflon permeable only to oxygen molecules. As a result, the ‘bump-
ing’ of these oxygen molecules to the tip of the needle is transformed into electrical
signals which are then processed by a computer. What the electrode measures is
the partial pressure of oxygen (pO2) within a tumor. A complete review of the
polarographic needle probe can be found in (Fatt, 1976). The Eppendorf needle
electrode is considered the ‘gold standard’ in tumor hypoxia quantification.
Although this technique provides the most direct measurement, it is limited by
its invasiveness. Some sites (kidney, urether, bladder, testicles) are considered
to be too risky for oxygen electrode use (Raleigh et al., 1996). An attractive
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alternative is immunohistochemical staining to detect proteins expressed by cells
during hypoxia. Hypoxia is one of the adverse cell environments; consequently, cells
are forced to adapt to it. The idea of immunohistochemistry is to identify chemicals
responsible for cells’ response. As the study of immunohistochemistry (protein
markers) advances, scientists have been able to isolate chemicals that are specific to
hypoxic cells. Raleigh and his group laid the basis for the hypoxia marker technique
in tumor hypoxia quantification. They observed that 2-nitroimidazoles hypoxic cell
radiosensitizers are activated and bound to hypoxic cells. This process shows an
oxygen dependence close to that for the radiobiological oxygen effect (Raleigh et al.,
1996; Horsman, 1998; Cline et al., 1990). The binding is a metabolic process. It
involves endogeneous nitroreductases (enzymes) which convert the nitroheterocyclic
compounds to binding intermediates in an oxygen dependence manner (Cline et al.,
1990).
There are many 2-nitroimidazole compounds; however, CCI-103F (used in ca-
nine solid tumors), pimonidazole, and EF5 are the ones commonly used in tumor
hypoxia research (Cline et al., 1997; Evans et al., 2006; Durand and Aquino-Parsons,
2006). While CCI-103F has been used solely in canine tumors, pimonidazole has
been widely used as a hypoxia marker in a number of human malignancies. It has
been designated as a novel hypoxia marker (Varia et al., 1998). The significant rela-
tionship between tumor blood vessels and EF5 staining makes this marker a “blood
vessel marker”, showing perfused blood vessels (Evans et al., 2001). Tumors with a
high density of EF5 indicate that they have already begun or completed angiogen-
esis. Additionally, thioredoxin may serve as a hypoxia marker because of its role
in redox mediators in biochemical pathways promoting cell survival under adverse
conditions such as hypoxia (Hedley et al., 2004).
The hypoxia markers mentioned earlier are of extrinsic or exogeneous type. It
means that there is a need for an injection of the marker prior to sampling (biopsy).
Fortunately, there are other types of hypoxia markers that do not require any ad-
ministration prior to biopsy: two such examples are HIF-1α and Carbonic Anhy-
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drase IX (CAIX). This type of hypoxia marker is called an intrinsic or endogeneous
marker.
The overexpression of hypoxia-inducible factor-1α (HIF-1α) indicates that tu-
mor cells have already begun to adapt to adverse environments (such as low oxy-
genation); hence, an anti-angiogenic therapy, whose goal is to fail tumor angiogene-
sis, may be more suitable rather than conventional cancer therapies (chemotherapy
or radiotherapy). For a more detail review about anti-angiogenic therapy, the reader
is directed to (Jain, 2005). Carbonic anhydrase IX (CAIX) is an enzyme expressed
on the cell membrane during hypoxia to balance the immediate extracellular mi-
croenvironment. It is widely regarded as a surrogate marker of chronic hypoxia
in various cancers (Olive et al., 2001; Hoogsteen et al., 2005; Mseide et al., 2004;
Hoskin et al., 2003); moreover, the overexpression of CAIX has been significantly
associated with a poor prognosis (Hedley et al., 2003).
In an attempt to replace the direct pO2 measurements with immunohistochemi-
cal assays of hypoxia protein markers, many researchers have claimed that hypoxia
markers can assess tumor hypoxia as well as the in vivo Eppendorf pO2 measure-
ments. Nevertheless, there is no agreement in current literature; some believe that
the two hypoxia quantification methods shall correlate with each other (Loncaster
et al., 2001) but some disagree with that conclusion (Mayer et al., 2005; Hedley
et al., 2003). Clarifying this confusion is one of the topics in this thesis; however,
first we will take a step back and attempt to ask a question: what do we want
to learn from the Eppendorf pO2 measurements and the immunohistochemistry of
CAIX respectively ? The next question is then how the two methods fare in quan-
tifying tumor hypoxia, whether or not they are in concordance with each other.
4.3 Tumor hypoxia inferences
The first question is definitely an inference problem; we do not have a complete
knowledge about the tumor. Our knowledge is limited to the data either obtained
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from biopsies or direct Eppendorf measurements and by our theoretical knowledge
about tumor dynamics. Unfortunately, unlike the laws of classical physics, the
laws of tumor dynamics have not been solidly formulated yet. Nonetheless, physi-
cians are called everyday to make decisions which affect patients directly, and data
analysis in the presence of uncertainty is the best tool available.
As already mentioned, the hypoxia data generated by the PMH group have been
analyzed with the classical orthodox statistical techniques, but some fundamental
ambiguities and contradictions have not been resolved. It is therefore of practical
importance to find out whether Bayesian probability methods are capable of offering
sharper and more consistent inferences from the available data. First, we will
proceed with tumor hypoxia quantification by the direct pO2 measurements.
4.3.1 The direct pO2 measurements
The pO2 measurements by the Eppendorf needle can be performed in linear, ran-
dom, or circular tracks. Each track consists of about 20 - 30 measurements each of
which is recorded in mmHg. A typical track of pO2 measurements is tabulated in
Tab. 4.1. From all the tracks obtained, we are interested in inferring the hypoxic
proportion, the proportion of measurements that is less than or equal to 5 mmHg
(HP5). This is a measure used by clinicians to quantify tumor hypoxia. If HP5
is greater than or equal to 50%, the tumor is considered to be hypoxic based on
the pO2 measurements. HP5 is by no means the standard rule. Some prefer to use
HP10 or HP2.5 to quantify tumor hypoxia.
Our collaborators at the Princess Margaret Hospital provided us with data sets
of pO2 measurements for 21 patients with invasive cervical carcinomas. From these,
we want to obtain the most probable HP5 from each patient. Let us denote by X
the proportion of the pO2 measurements that are less than or equal to 5 mmHg.
As it was explained earlier, the inferential machinery in Bayesian methodology is
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Study number Track number Position pO2 (mmHg)
2136 1 1 3.5
2136 1 2 3.6
2136 1 3 3.8
2136 1 4 3.5
2136 1 5 3.8
2136 1 6 47.6
2136 1 7 154.7
2136 1 8 118.1
2136 1 9 82.1
2136 1 10 50.2
2136 1 11 29.5
2136 1 12 7.8
2136 1 13 2.9
2136 1 14 2.8
2136 1 15 2.7
2136 1 16 6.6
2136 1 17 18.1
2136 1 18 31.7
2136 1 19 40.7
2136 1 20 32.7
2136 1 21 24.8
2136 1 22 13.5
2136 1 23 5.2
2136 1 24 3.2
2136 1 25 3.2
2136 1 26 3.2
2136 1 27 2.8
2136 1 28 3.3
2136 1 29 3.2
2136 1 30 3.0
2136 1 31 2.8
2136 1 32 3.4
2136 1 33 3.1
Table 4.1: The first track of the pO2 measurements taken from patient 2136
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Bayes’ theorem:
P (X(i)|D(i), I) ∝ P (D(i)|X(i), I)× P (X(i)|I), (4.1)
where the superscript i denotes the ith track (i = 1, 2, ..., 5) and I is the background
information such as each track and each measurement is independent of one another,
respectively. By the application of the Bayes’ theorem, we obtain the most probable
value of the HP5 in light of the data and prior knowledge.
For the prior knowledge or the prior probability assignment, we assign a uniform
or ignorance prior,
P (X(i)|I) =
 1, for 0 ≤ X(i) ≤ 10 otherwise , (4.2)
because we have no reason to prefer any value for the HP5. The direct probability
or the likelihood function can be thought of as obtaining the data ‘r measurements
that are less than or equal to 5 mmHg in N measurements’ in a track, which is a
binomial distribution,
P (D(i)|X(i), I) ∝ X(i)r (1−X(i))N−r. (4.3)
The first application of the Bayes’ theorem gives us a posterior probability density
function (pdf) for HP5 based on one track of measurements; this posterior pdf can
in turn serve as the prior knowledge for the second track and so on. Thus, one can
view Bayes’ theorem as an inferential tool that gradually incorporates additional
information as they become available to improve our knowledge. The best estimate
for the most probable HP5 value in a patient is given by the maximum of the
posterior pdf in light of the last track’s data and the uncertainty is simply the full
width at half maximum (FWHM) of the posterior pdf. The results are summarized
in Tab. 4.2. For completeness, we also present the other commonly-used hypoxic
proportions: HP2.5 and HP10, summarized in Tab. 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. Based
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on the criterion that a tumor is considered to be hypoxic if its HP5 is greater than or
equal to 50% (Pitson et al., 2001), there are 12 out of 21 tumors can be classified as
hypoxic (Tab. 4.2). In contrast, only nine of the same tumors would be considered
as hypoxic marker under the HP2.5 rule, while that number goes up to 14 under the
HP10 rule. Although these rules are arbitrary, most medical researchers consider




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.2 The immunohistochemical assay of CAIX
In addition to the direct pO2 measurements, our collaborators at the Princess Mar-
garet Hospital provided us with immunohistochemical assay of carbonic anhydrase
IX (CAIX) data from the same patients with invasive cervical carcinomas. A typi-
cal size of biopsy is about five millimeters in diameter. The first data set consists
of ten patients from whom three to five biopsies were obtained from each patients.
Each biopsy is cut into four slices, except for three tumors (2144, 2148, and 2152)
whose biopsies are fully sectioned. CAIX content was assessed as a percentage of
area positive for the protein within each tumor slice (with protocol described in
(Iakovlev et al., 2007)). The percentage of CAIX-positive pixels (area stained /
total area) within the three tumors (2144, 2148, and 2152) of the first data set is
shown in Fig. 4.1. The data generation for the first data sets is illustrated in Fig.
4.2. Based on each patient’s data, we want to infer the proportion of CAIX-positive
cells in the whole tumor. Additionally, we want to find the minimum number of
biopsies which is sufficient to learn about the tumor hypoxia.
This is again an inference problem which shall be tackled by Bayes’ theorem.
Let us denote Y be the proportion of CAIX-positive cells within a tumor. In other
words, we assume that the amount of CAIX positive staining is a constant in the
tumor, which is equivalent to saying that the tumor hypoxia is supposed to be ho-
mogeneously distributed throughout the tumor. This is a simplifying assumption
that is frequently made in the literature. Nonetheless, it is a very optimistic as-
sumption which will be discussed in chapter six. Now our knowledge is encapsulated
in the form of a posterior probability density function (pdf) of Y ,
P (Y |D(i), I) ∝ P (D(i)|Y, I)× P (Y |I), (4.4)
which follows from the Bayes’ theorem (i indicates the biopsy number). Since we
have no information regarding the proportion of CAIX-positive cells, we assign a
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of CAIX-positive pixels within three (a, b, and c) tumors
with fully sliced biopsies. Each (a, b, and c) panel is for one patient, five biopsies
per patient, and each point gives CAIX value within an individual slice. The slices
are shown in the sequence in which they were cut. Adapted from (Iakovlev et al.,
2007)
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Figure 4.2: The data generation protocol for the first data sets
uniform prior,
P (Y |I) =
 1, for 0 ≤ Y ≤ 10 otherwise . (4.5)
The direct probability however is different than in the case of pO2 measurements.
The stained tumor slices are imaged by fluorescence using a TISSUEscope laser
scanning microscope (Iakovlev et al., 2007). A threshold for determining CAIX
positivity within a tumor slice is set by a pathologist (Dr. Vladimir Iakovlev). Thus,
there are occasions of over- and under-estimating the proportion of CAIX-positivite
cells. This inaccuracy (noise) can be assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution with




j = Y + εj, (4.6)
where j = 1, 2, ..., n is the number of slices within a biopsy (i). Starting with the
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first biopsy, the likelihood function is given by
























j − Y )2
}
, (4.7)
assuming each slice is independent of one another, which is reasonable because the
slices were cut far enough from each other (Iakovlev et al., 2007). The reason why
the likelihood function takes this form is that, as was mentioned earlier, that the



























j − Y )2
}
, (4.8)
which is exactly Eq. 4.7. Assuming that the noise is independent among the slices,
the above equation simplifies to Eq. 4.7,










j − Y )2
}
. (4.9)
The posterior probability density function (pdf) for the proportion of CAIX-
positive cells based on the first biopsy is given by a joint conditional probability
density P (Y, s|Dj, I) because s is also unknown. The presence of the nuisance
parameter s can be handled easily by marginalization, namely
P (Y |D(1), I) =
∫
R
P (Y, s|D(1), I)ds, (4.10)
where R is the range of s. The choice of R is not important in the case of a param-
eter estimation problem (however, it is crucial if we are doing a model selection).
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Applying Bayes’ theorem to the integrand of Eq. 4.10 we have
P (Y |D(1), I) =
∫
R




P (D(i)|Y, s, I) P (Y |s, I) P (s|I)ds. (4.11)
Now the first factor is given by Eq. 4.7 and in the second factor we may use Eq.
4.5, since by hypothesis P (Y |s, I) = P (Y |I). For the last factor in the integrand
we use Jeffrey’s prior,
P (s|I) =
 1s for 0 < s < ∞0 otherwise , (4.12)
because s is a scale parameter. Hence, the posterior pdf is (after integrating with
a change of variable t = 1
s
)























which can be put in the form of a Student-t distribution (see Appendix B). The
best estimate of the proportion of CAIX-positive cells is obtained by maximizing
Eq. 4.13 and the uncertainty of the estimate is the full width at the half maximum
of the posterior pdf. For the cases where the posterior is unimodal and symmetric
with respect to the maximum, the best estimate of the proportion of CAIX-positive
cells within the tumor can be simply encapsulated in the form
Y = Ŷ ± σ, (4.14)
where, as usual, σ is proportional to the FWHM provided that the posterior pdf is
very well approximated by Gaussian density. However, as already mentioned, for
the cases where the posterior pdf is multimodal (patient 2148), the full posterior pdf
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Patient 2144 Patient 2148 Patient 2152
Biopsy Ŷ (%) σ (%) Ŷ (%) σ (%) Ŷ (%) σ (%)
1 8.2 0.6 2.3 0.3 4.5 0.6
2 9.5 0.6 2.9 0.6∗ 6.2 0.6
3 9.9 0.6 3.4 0.4 6.3 0.5
4 9.1 0.5 3.4 0.3 5.9 0.5
5 9.2 0.5 3.7 0.3 6.6 0.4
Table 4.5: Summary of the proportion of CAIX-positive staining from the first data
sets where the biopsies are fully-sectioned. The ∗ denotes cases where the posterior
pdf is not symmetric.
is the best way to present the inference about the proportion of CAIX-positive cells.
The inferences about the tumor hypoxia obtained from the first biopsy of the three
patients constituting the first data set are given by the first row of Tab. 4.5. Next,
we apply the same algorithm to the second biopsy. This time, however, we are not
completely ignorant about the value of our parameter Y , and so the uninformative
prior of Eq. 4.5 is no longer appropriate. In fact, since what we have learned about
Y from the first biopsy is given by Eq. 4.13, we use this posterior as the new
prior in Bayes’ theorem, and as a result we obtain the new posterior P (Y |D(2), I)
which incorporates information from both the first and the second biopsies. This
sequential analysis is repeated for the third, fourth, and fifth biopsies, and the final
posterior P (Y |D(5), I) will contain all the information that can be extracted from all
five biopsies (under the assumption of homogeneous distribution of hypoxia). The
results of the first data sets analysis are summarized in Tab. 4.5. For the biopsies
that are fully sectioned, we show the posterior probability density functions (pdfs)
in Fig. 4.3. As it is evident from Fig. 4.3 and Tab. 4.5, from the first data
set (patient 2144, 2148, and 2152) whose biopsies are fully sectioned, two biopsies
seem sufficient to learn about the oxygenation status in the whole tumor. The
importance of this result will be discussed in chapter six.
The second data set was generated by a different protocol (Iakovlev et al.,
2007). Shortly, two biopsies from each of the 24 patients are sectioned three levels:
the first and the second level are 250 µm apart and the third level is taken from
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Figure 4.3: The posteriors of the first biopsy obtained from three patients of the
first data set
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Figure 4.4: The posteriors for each of the five biopsies (black dashed: first biopsy;
red dashed: second biopsy; blue dashed: third biopsy; green dashed: fourth biopsy;
bold solid: fifth biopsy)
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Figure 4.5: The data generation protocol for the second data sets
the opposite side of the biopsy (Fig. 4.5). CAIX content was also assessed as a
percentage of area positive for the protein within the tumor tissue. The Bayesian
analysis of this second data set proceeds in exactly the same manner as in the first
case. The difference, of course, is that we have only two biopsies per tumor; hence,
the knowledge we can infer from the data will be encapsulated by the posterior
P (Y |D(2), I), and the most plausible values of Y obtained are shown in Tab. 4.6.
Given the relatively large number of patients, we are not showing the graphs of
all posteriors, but only a few representative samples in Fig. 4.7. The top three
panels show typical examples of symmetric posteriors in which the contribution in
the increase of our knowledge from the second biopsy is either minimal or clearly
visible. Overall, 17 out of 24 cases have a similar behavior. The bottom two panels
of Fig. 4.7, however, show two of the several cases where the result or our inferences
cannot be summarized simply by the two number Ŷ and σ. Rather than illustrating
all the pdfs, we show a subset of the pdfs; some of the cases where two biopsies
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Biopsy 1 Biopsy 2
Patient Ŷ (%) Ŷ (%)
2142 9.3 ± 0.6 7.1 ± 0.4
2144 14.5 ± 0.3 14.6 ± 0.3
∗ 2149 13.3 ± 1.8 10.0 ± 1.4
215 6.1 ±0.8 6.6 ± 0.8
2152 8.6 ± 0.6 8.7 ± 0.6
2154 3.9 ± 0.7 4.1 ± 0.7
2156 2.6 ± 0.3 2.7 ± 0.3
2157 2.4 ± 0.5 2.8 ± 0.6
2161 17.3 ± 0.8 17.5 ± 0.8
2163 1.7 ± 0.2 1.7 ± 0.2
2165 0.41 ± 0.02 0.42 ± 0.02
2166 2.9 ± 0.2 3.0 ± 0.2
2167 1.0 ± 0.2 1.1 ± 0.2
∗ 2169 17.2 ± 2.6 5.7 ± 0.6
∗ 2170 9.4 ± 1.8 0.38 ± 0.1
2171 21.8 ± 0.7 8.8 ± 0.5
∗ 2172 35.8 ± 1.5 36.9 ± 1.3
2174 12.7 ± 0.4 12.9 ± 0.4
∗ 2175 27.8 ± 1.7 26.2 ± 1.5
2176 16.2 ± 0.5 15.9 ± 0.6
2177 0.49 ± 0.04 0.49 ± 0.04
2179 7.1 ± 2.0 6.4 ± 0.8
∗ 2180 51.8 ± 1.6 13.8 ± 1.4
∗ 2183 26.0 ± 1.3 28.7 ± 1.1
Table 4.6: Summary for the best estimate of the overall CAIX percentage within
a cervical carcinoma along with the reliability of the estimate based on three-level
sampling protocol. The ∗ denotes cases in which the inference Y = Ŷ ± σ is not
reliable.
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suffice and a couple of cases where two biopsies are not sufficient (Fig. 4.7).
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Figure 4.6: Examples of P (Y |D(2)) from the second data set which results in sym-
metric and unimodal pdf (thin dashed: first biopsy; solid: second biopsy).
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Figure 4.7: Examples of P (Y |D(2)) which results in bimodal or truncated pdf (thin
dashed: first biopsy; solid: second biopsy).
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4.4 Correlation and concordance
The next important step in tumor hypoxia research is to find out whether or not
the two tumor hypoxia quantifications tell the same story about hypoxia within
a tumor. In other words, we need to ascertain whether or not the indirect im-
munohistochemical assays of CAIX protein marker is correlated with the direct
pO2 measurements. This problem has been tackled by numerous researchers, but
so far no consensus has been reached.
Loncaster and her groups was the first to demonstrate that CAIX was correlated
with tumor oxygen measurements in cervical carcinomas, based on a prospective
study of 68 patients (Loncaster et al., 2001); however, other research groups were
not able to reproduce the conclusion. Some research groups (Hedley et al., 2003;
Mayer et al., 2005) showed that CAIX expression and tumor oxygenation status do
not correlate in cervical carcinomas. In addition to the heterogeneity of the tumors,
the statistical analyses performed by each research group might be different. This
provides challenges in order to confirm other studies.
A Bayesian approach to the problem does not require any ad-hoc procedures.
Assuming that both HP5 and CAIX staining measure the amount of hypoxia in a
tissue, we denote by X the former and by Y the latter. Next we introduce the joint
pdf P (X, Y |Dx, Dy, I), where Dx and Dy are the available data for HP5 and CAIX
respectively, and I is the background information. With this pdf the concept of
error-bar in the one-dimensional case can be easily extended by the introduction of








(Y − Ŷ )2 P (X, Y |Dx, Dy, I)dY dX, (4.16)




(X − X̂)(Y − Ŷ ) P (X, Y |Dx, Dy, I)dXdY, (4.17)
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Figure 4.8: A scatter-plot for the HP5 versus CAIX in 21 patients
where R is the range of X and Y and X̂ and Ŷ are the best estimates of the hypoxic
proportion by HP5 and the CAIX-positive cells respectively. If this were applied to
the two hypoxia measurements of each patient, we would get σ2XY = 0. This is due
to the fact that the joint posterior pdf, P (X, Y |Dx, Dy, I) factors into the separate
pdf for X and Y , since the two hypoxia measurements are independent.
In other words, we would be asking the wrong question. A more appropriate
question is to ask whether a scatter-plot of X and Y for all patients shows any
correlation. In Fig. 4.8, we display the best estimate of the percentage of CAIX-
positive staining against the best estimate of the HP5. The error bars are neglected
for a reason that will be explained later on. Having pooled all the data from 21
patients, we would like to observe the correlation between the HP5 and the CAIX.
We can then fit an ellipse on the data and then investigate whether the major axis
of the ellipse has a positive or negative slope (Sivia, 2006). To begin with, we use
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the general equation of a conic,
aX2 + bXY + cY 2 + dX + eY + f = 0. (4.18)
If the discriminant,
• b2 − 4ac < 0, we have an ellipse, or circle;
• b2 − 4ac = 0, we have a parabola;
• b2 − 4ac > 0, we have a hyperbola.
Furthermore, one may rewrite Eq. 4.18 in the following way:
xT AQ x = 0, (4.19)







the subscript Q stands for quadratic.
We can proceed with the similar procedures as in the case of parameter estima-
tion (Section 3.1). We can model the data Xi in general as
X2i = [AY
2
i + BXiYi + CXi + DYi + E] + εi, i = 1, 2, ..., 21 (4.21)
where εi is the noise. Eq. 4.21 is related to Eq. 4.18: a = 1, A = −c, B = −b,
C = −d, D = −e, and E = −f . As it was explained earlier, assuming the noise
has an unknown second moment and using uninformative prior for the parameters
but Jeffrey’s prior for the standard deviation of the noise, we have the following
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Figure 4.9: Ellipse-fitting to the data
posterior pdf,
P ({A, ..., E}|D, I) ∝ 1[∑21
i=1 (X
2





Using the optimization technique explained in Section 3.1, we can obtain the most
plausible value for each estimate. Fig. 4.9 illustrates the fitting according to our
proposed model. Having obtained the most plausible values for each parameter, we







In order to analyze the nature of the ellipse, we can investigate the first minor of
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The principal axes of the ellipse can be determined from the eigenvectors of A1. Fur-
thermore, the inverse of A1 is related to the covariance matrix, whose off-diagonal
entries indicate the correlation coefficient between X and Y (Sivia, 2006). From
these pooled data, we have a correlation coefficient of 0.40, which is similar to the
result obtained by the PMH group (Iakovlev et al., 2007).
For better visualization purposes, one can transform the CAIX values into their
logarithm space and then proceed with the similar conical fitting. In doing so, we
obtain Fig. 4.10 and a slightly stronger correlation coefficient of 0.47. One has to
keep in mind that the axes in Fig. 4.10 are not in the same scale.
Let us refer back to the statement that “the error-bars on each datum can be
neglected”. Had we included the error-bars on each datum, we would have had a
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very much smaller ellipse, whose axes are perpendicular, around each datum. One
of the possible approaches is then to perform a convolution between each small
ellipse and a much larger one encompassing all the data. Nonetheless, we realize
that a convolution between two functions, one of which is much larger than the
other, would only give us the larger function (Gregory, 2005). Our conclusion
would not have changed, had we included the added complexity of the error-bars
around each datum.
In addition to correlation statistic, many medical researchers have used a concor-
dance statistic to measure the degree of agreements between two raters (Feinstein,
2002). This technique can be implemented in tumor hypoxia research. We begin
by setting a threshold for which the tumor is classified as hypoxic. For example,
according to the PMH group a reasonable choice is ≥ 8% for the CAIX measure-
ment and ≥ 50% for the HP5. Given this much, we can proceed with our Bayesian
approach as follows. Let H ∈ [0, 1] denote the concordance measure. If H = 0,
then the two techniques are in perfect discordance; whereas, if H = 1, then the two
techniques are in perfect concordance. Thus, by the application of Bayes’ theorem,
we have
P (H|{data}, I) ∝ P ({data}|H, I)× P (H|I), (4.25)
where I denotes our background information, for instance, the assumption of ho-
mogeneous tumor can be included in I. Since we have no additional information
for the concordance, we use the uniform prior probability for H,
P (H|I) =
 1, for 0 ≤ H ≤ 10 otherwise. (4.26)
The direct probability of obtaining the data ‘r agreements; i.e., both analyses in-
dicate hypoxic tissue (when the CAIX percentage is ≥ 8% and the HP5 is ≥ 50%)
and non-hypoxic tissue (when the CAIX percentage is < 8% and the HP5 is < 50%)
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Figure 4.11: The posterior pdfs for the concordance between the estimate of the
proportion of CAIX-positive cells and the HP5 in 21 patients.
in N patients’ follows a binomial distribution:
P ({data}|H, I) ∝ Hr (1−H)N−r. (4.27)
Finally, substituting Eg. 4.26 and 4.27 into the Bayes’ theorem (Eq. 4.25) gives
us a posterior probability density function (pdf) for the concordance and the best
estimate of the concordance,
H = 0.67± 0.10. (4.28)
Thus, our updated state-of-knowledge about this type of concordance between the
CAIX immunohistochemical analysis and the direct pO2 measurements in quan-
tifying tumor hypoxia is depicted in Fig. 4.11. Of course, if the thresholds are
chosen differently, then this estimate will change. Nonetheless, this definition of
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concordance appears to be quite useful in a medical setting.
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Chapter 5
Data analysis of phase II clinical
trials of relapsed ovarian cancers
Before we proceed with the analysis, it is useful to provide some background knowl-
edge for this clinical study. We will begin with a brief overview of clinical trials and
ovarian cancers. For readers who are familiar with these concepts, the next two
sections may be skipped and proceed directly to the third section of this chapter.
5.1 A brief review of clinical trials
According to some scholars, the origin of clinical trials dates as early as the year
980 when Avicenna, an Arabian physician and philosopher, proposed some rules to
evaluate the effects of drugs on diseases. In his Canon of Medicine, he suggested
that
“a remedy should be used in its natural state, with uncomplicated dis-
ease, and should be observed in two ‘contrary type of disease’ ... the
time of action and reproducibility of the treatment effect should be
studied” (Meinert, 1986)
The formal definition and constitution of a clinical trial however have not been pro-
posed until centuries later. There are several definitions of a clinical trial; however,
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Everitt and Pickles (Everitt and Pickles, 2004) define a clinical trial as
“any form of planned experiment designed to assess the most appro-
priate treatment of patients with a particular medical condition, where
the outcome in a group of patients treated with the test treatment are
compared with those observed in a similar group of patients receiving
control treatment, and patients in both groups are enrolled, treated,
and followed over the same period.”
Consequently, studies involving animals or carried out in vitro using human biolog-
ical substances cannot be regarded as clinical trials. The first recorded clinical trial
was conducted by James Lind in 1747 while at sea on board the Salisbury. For the
full historical account of clinical trials, interested readers are directed to (Meinert,
1986). Tab. 1.1 of (Everitt and Pickles, 2004) briefly summarizes historical events
in the development of clinical trials.
Early clinical trials allocated their patients into test and control groups (also
known as treatment arms) in an arbitrary and non-systematic scheme. Fisher then
introduced the concept of randomization in clinical trials and the first properly
randomized group was for the clinical trial of streptomycin in the treatment of
pulmonary tubercolosis (Everitt and Pickles, 2004). Since then randomized clin-
ical trials have become a standard procedure in the evaluation of new drugs or
treatments. The justification for randomized clinical trials is that “[They] nicely
illustrate the desire of modern democratic society to justify [their] medical choices
on the basis of the objectivity inherent in statistical and quantitative data” (Everitt
and Pickles, 2004).
Randomization is regarded as the primary requirement in any acceptable clinical
trial. Another necessary requirement for an acceptable clinical trial is blinding. The
fundamental idea of blinding is that trial participants, physicians, and those who
are involved with their management and data collection, shall not be influenced by
knowledge of the assigned treatment. Blinding is a way to minimize the possibility
of bias (Everitt and Pickles, 2004). There are two types of blinding processes:
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1. Single-blinding, in which only the patients who are unaware of which treat-
ment(s) they are receiving;
2. Double-blinding, when both the patients and the investigators are unaware
of the patients’ treatment(s).
The most common design for a clinical trial is the fixed sample size parallel
groups design with random allocation of patients to treatment(s). This design is
easy to implement; however, a large number of patients are needed to estimate
reliably the magnitude of any treatment difference. We shall keep in mind that the
clinical trial design has been formulated under the frequentist methodology; as a
result, a large number of sample size is necessary to minimize the effect of ‘chance’.
In the parallel group design, each clinical trial group is administered one treatment.
A modification of the parallel group design is the cross-over design, in which each
patient receives two treatments; for example, in the 2 × 2 cross-over design, one
group receives two treatments in the order AB and the other group receives in the
order BA, with patients randomly allocated to the two groups (Senn, 1993). The
second treatment must be administered once the effect of the first treatment has
disappeared. This requirement can be difficult to satisfy; hence, a cross-over design
is rarely used. A more general clinical trial design is the factorial design, proposed
by the late David Byar in 1992. He stated that “such designs may offer impressive
gains in efficiency compared with series of trials studying one treatment at a time.
This is especially true when treatements do not interact with one another” (Byar
et al., 1993). In a factorial design, several treatments are considered at the same
time. The number of clinical trial groups (treatment arms) is 2n, where n is the
number of test treatments. Lubsen and Pocock conducted a clinical trial with a
factorial design for three test treatments, ISIS-4 trial, whose protocol is summarized
as follows:
“Patients were simultaneously randomized to each of the three active
treatments or their respective controls (captopril or its placebo, monon-
itrate or its placebo, magnesium or no magnesium) in ... a complete
2 × 2 × 2 factorial (sometimes called a three-way factorial). Note that
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there are, clinically speaking 2× 2× 2 = 8 treatment groups: captopril
plus mononitrate plus magnesium, captopril plus mononitrate, captopril
plus magnesium, mononitrate plus magnesium, captopril alone, monon-
itrate alone, magnesium alone, and none of these (placebo).” (Lubsen
and Pocock, 1994)
Those three clinical trial designs are the ones commonly conducted; randomization
and blinding can easily be implemented in those designs as long as no surgery is
involved. There are however other clinical trial designs such as open design and
orphan design, for which randomization and blinding cannot be guaranteed. The
open design is usually for any clinical trial involving a surgical procedure; whereas,
the orphan design is conducted for testing drugs or treatments to treat diseases
affecting fewer than 200,000 peoples worldwide or rare genetic diseases (Health,
2000). Due to the small sample size, randomization is difficult for this case.
Whichever clinical trial the design investigators choose, it has four well-known
phases (Everitt and Pickles, 2004):
1. Phase I: Clinical pharmacology and toxicity;
2. Phase II: Initial clinical investigation for treatment effect;
3. Phase III: Full-scale evaluation of treatment; and
4. Phase IV: Post-marketing surveillance.
The first phase of clinical trials deal primarily with drug safety and toxicity. One
of the objectives is to determine the maximum tolerated dose (MTD), obtained
from dose-escalation experiments. Additionally, investigators also conduct studies
of drug metabolism and bioavailability. Typically, this phase consists of about 20 -
80 participants who are in a healthy condition. The second phase of clinical trials
continues to monitor the safety of the drugs or treatments and their effectiveness
in a larger sample size (typically about 100 - 200 patients). In this phase, drugs
or treatments are screened; those which are effective are selected to proceed to the
next phase. The primary objectives in the phase II of clinical trials are to
• identify the group of patients that can benefit from the drug or treatment
and to
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• verify and estimate the effectiveness of the drug dosage determined in the
previous phase (Everitt and Pickles, 2004).
The third phase of clinical trials is the one which is usually made public. This
phase consists of a substantial number of patients (usually greater than 200 pa-
tients from various hospitals) and it is the most expensive phase of clinical trials.
In this phase, a new drug or treatment is evaluated against the current standard
treatment(s). Under the standard clinical trial protocol, investigators cannot mod-
ify the clinical trial once it has already begun this phase. It has to continue until
the prescribed endpoint is reached. The reason for this stiffness in clinical trials is
to ensure that randomization and blinding processes are preserved for quantitative
analysis purposes. Once the phase III is completed, the drug or treatment is deter-
mined whether or not it can be marketed. If so, the final phase of clinical trials is
to closely monitor the patients using the drug or treatment for any possible adverse
effects. Further research may still be required to study the long-term morbidity or
mortality caused by the new drug or treatment.
5.2 A brief introduction to ovarian cancer
According to the National Cancer Institute (NCI, 2009), ovarian cancer is defined
as
“cancer that forms in tissues of the ovary (one of a pair of female re-
productive glands in which the ova, or eggs, are formed). Most ovarian
cancers are either ovarian epithelial carcinomas (cancer that begins in
the cells on the surface of the ovary) or malignant germ cell tumors
(cancer that begins in egg cells).”
The estimated new cases and deaths from ovarian cancer in Canada in 2008 were
2,500 and 1,700 respectively (CCS, 2009) and in the United States for the same
year, the estimated new cases and deaths were 21,650 and 15,520 respectively.
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The typical treatment for ovarian cancer includes surgery, chemotherapy, radi-
ation therapy, immunotherapy, or combination of therapies. The current first-line
treatment for patients with ovarian cancer is a combination of carboplatin and pa-
clitaxel. Unfortunately, despite advances in therapy, ovarian cancer still remains
one of the deadliest gynecological cancers. Here is a statistical summary for ovarian
cancers:
“Less than 30% of women with advanced stage disease survive long-
term. When diagnosed in stage I, 90% of patients can be cured with
conventional surgery and chemotherapy. At present, only 25% of ovar-
ian cancers are detected in stage I due, in part, to the absence of specific
symptoms and to lack of an effective screening strategy” (Badgwell and
Bast, 2007) [and] ... 70% of stage IIA (metastases to the uterus or Fal-
lopian tubes) tumors are curable if detected, 70% of women who are di-
agnosed with stage III and IV tumors have widespread intra-abdominal
disease or distant metastases at diagnosis. For these patients, the cure
rate plummets to < 30%. ... Ovarian cancer has an overall cure rate of
approximately 45%, a relatively discouraging prognosis” (Rustin et al.,
2004).
Despite conventional treatments, the mortality rate remains greater than 50% of
the diagnosed patients and 80% of the patients will relapse (Rustin et al., 2004).
Recent breakthrough in biomedical research have resulted in the development of
numerous molecularly-targeted agents that inhibit signal transduction, angiogen-
esis, and other cellular pathways. Some of these agents, such as bevacizumab,
trastuzumab (Herceptin) or Gleevec, are undergoing clinical trials in the hope of
continuing to improve the treatment of ovarian cancers.
In addition to advances in cancer treatments, it is evident from the statistics
that early detection of ovarian cancers is crucial. Currently, there is no single
effective early diagnostic tool for ovarian cancers. The most commonly reported
symptoms prior to ovarian cancer diagnosis are “abdominal or pelvic pain, bloating,
gastrointestinal distress, and abdominal swelling” (Smith et al., 2005), which can
be symptoms for other diseases; hence, misdiagnosis or late diagnosis often occurs
in ovarian cancer patients.
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The most direct detection tool for early diagnosis is transvaginal sonography
(TVS), but TVS alone is incapable to detect ovarian cancer effectively; some tu-
mor locations prohibit the use of such imaging techniques. Additionally, obtaining
high resolution biological images is still expensive and an active area of research.
Furthermore, one may not be able to distinguish whether tumor masses are benign
or malignant solely from their images.
One can determine the characteristic of tumor masses by performing biomarker
assays, identifying certain proteins common in cancer cells. Cancer antigen 125
(CA-125), “a heavily glycosylated high-molecular-weight mucin (MUC 16)” (O’Brien
et al., 1991; Yin et al., 2002), has been widely used as a serum marker for ovarian
cancers. Unlike CAIX, which is a protein present in the extracellular cell mem-
brane, CA-125 is a larger protein that can be easily separated from blood plasma.
The discovery of CA-125 serum has been promising and many have been convinced
that it is one of the best early indicators for ovarian cancers because
“CA-125 levels are elevated in 50 − 60% of patients with early stage
ovarian cancer and in 90% of patients diagnosed with late stage ovarian
cancer (Bast et al., 2005). Overall, significant expression of CA-125 is
observed in 80% of ovarian cancers at a tissue level” (Rosen et al., 2005).
The interpretation of serum marker analysis depends heavily on statistical method-
ologies for the analysis of serum marker data. Two important and commonly used
measures in the studies of reliability of diagnostic tools are sensitivity and speci-
ficity. Sensitivity measures the proportion of actual positives correctly identified as
positives (true positive). Specificity measures the proportion of negatives correctly
identified (true negative). These two measures (Tab. 5.1) are closely related to the
concepts of type I (α) and type II (β) errors in orthodox statistics (Armitage et al.,
2002),
sensitivity =
number of true positive
number of true positive + number of false negative
,
specificity =
number of true negative





+ 1− β (sensitivity) β
- α 1− α (specificity)
↓ ↓ positive predictive value ↓ negative predictive value
Table 5.1: The binary classification for diagnostic tests
In addition to sensitivity and specificity, positive predictive value is also a com-
monly used measure in diagnostic studies; it measures the proportion of true posi-
tives,
PPV =
number of true positive
number of true positive + number of false positive
. (5.2)
Thus, a reliable diagnostic tool shall have a high sensitivity, specificity and in turn,
a high positive predictive value.
In order to be a reliable diagnostic tool, CA-125 has to satisfy the above re-
quirements: high sensitivity, high specificity, and high positive predictive value. For
general population of women (pre-menopausal and post-menopausal), CA-125 has
limited sensitivity; moreover, individual values of CA-125 are not sufficiently spe-
cific for early detection of ovarian cancers (Badgwell and Bast, 2007). CA-125 level
is elevated in response to any irritation of the surfaces of body cavity, the peritoneal
cavity, and the pleural cavity. Elevation of CA-125 level may also be caused by other
non-malignant diseases such as cirrhosis of the liver, pneumonia, and heart failure.
A variety of benign conditions including menstruation, first trimester of pregnancy,
and endometriosis can increase CA-125 level. All of these provide challenges for
using CA-125 as an early diagnostic tool for ovarian cancers. To enhance both sensi-
tivity and specificity of CA-125, many have studied and performed clinical trials on
the combination of CA-125 assay and transvaginal sonography (TVS) concurrently
and sequentially. The Prostate, Lung, Colon, and Ovary (PLCO) Screening Trial
has conducted ovarian cancer screening clinical trial for post-menopausal women
between 55 and 74 years of age: 37,000 patients randomized to the screening group
of the trial and another 37,000 patients participating as non-screened controls (Bast
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et al., 2005; Hayes et al., 2000). The preliminary report of this study suggested
a combined positive predictive value (PPV) of TVS and CA-125 was 23.5%; as
opposed to individual PPV of 1% and 3.7% for TVS and CA-125 respectively.
In an effort to improve sensitivity and specificity of early diagnostic tools for
ovarian cancers, many have also considered the use of multiple serum biomarkers.
There have been many novel biomarkers discovered for the past decade. Badgewell
and Bast provide a clear and brief summary for the commonly used and recently
discovered biomarkers for ovarian cancers (Badgwell and Bast, 2007). To name a
few of those: mesothelin, a protein attached to the cell surface thought to have a
role in cell adhesion and possibly in cell-to-cell recognition and signalling; kallikrein,
enzyme that has peptide bond in protein; osteopontin, a glycoprotein responsible
for cell attachment and wound healing; vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF),
sub-family of growth factors which is important in angiogenesis; interleukin, a group
of signalling molecules crucial in immune system, and many others. While advances
in biomedical research lead to the discovery of many novel biomarkers, the cost of
administering them in patients is still very high. Consequently, CA-125 is still
actively used as a serum marker for ovarian cancers despite its relatively low speci-
ficity.
In the next section, we illustrate how Bayesian methods contribute to analyze
the study of phase II clinical trials of relapsed ovarian cancer patients involving
molecularly-targeted agents (MTAs) conducted by the Princess Margaret Hospital.
5.3 Clinical trials’ data classifications
We have clinical trials’ data from four phase II relapsed ovarian cancer clinical trials
involving molecularly-targeted agents (MTAs). Each clinical trial consists of eligible
eighteen to sixty-five patients. For each clinical trial group, one or a combination of
MTAs is administered (Welsch, Wang, Gunawan, Mackay, Nathwani, Yau, Tsang,
MacAlpine, Sivaloganathan, and Oza, Welsch et al.). The level of CA-125 serum
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marker is monitored regularly according to the Gynocologic Cancer InterGroup
(GCIG) guidelines for a relapsed clinical trial. In a relapsed clinical trial, a patient
is classified to have a response according to a CA-125 serum level if there is “at
least a 50% reduction in CA-125 levels from a pretreatment sample and the response
must be confirmed and maintained for at least 28 days” (GCIG, 2009).
Additionally, the longest diameter of the tumor is regularly monitored during
each follow-up according to the Response Criteria in Solid Tumors (RECIST) guide-
lines. Without going into details, we summarize some of the important concepts.
First, the eligibility criteria for clinical trials’ patients are described in the following
(RECIST, 2009):
• Only patients with measurable disease at baseline (course index 0) should be
included in protocols. Measurable disease means that there is at least one
measurable lesion;
• all measurements should be taken and recorded in metric notation. All base-
line evaluations should be performed as closely as possible to the beginning
of treatment and never more than 4 weeks prior to the treatment;
• the same method of assessment and the same technique must be used at
baseline and during follow-up; and finally,
• tumor markers alone cannot be used to assess response. If markers are initially
above the upper normal limit, they must [be in a normal range] for a patient to
be considered in complete clinical response when all lesions have disappeared.
The baseline documentation of “target” lesions shall be performed on lesions with
the longest diameter (LD) and lesions which are suitable for accurate repeated
measurements. The baseline LD is used as reference to characterize the objective
tumor. The eligible clinical trials’ patients are classified in the following way:
• Complete Response (CR): disappearance of all target lesions
• Partial Response (PR): At least 30% decrease in the sum of the LD of
target lesions, taking as reference the baseline sum LD
• Progressive Disease (PD): At least 20% increase in the sum of LD of
target lesions, taking as reference the smallest sum LD recorded since the
treatment started or the appearance of one or more new lesions
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• Stable Disease (SD): Neither sufficient shrinkage to qualify for PR nor
sufficient increase to qualify for PD, taking as reference the smallest sum LD
since the treatment started.
Note that to be assigned a status of PR or CR, changes in tumor measurements
must be confirmed by repeat assessments that should be performed no less than
4 weeks after the criteria for response are first met. In the case of SD, follow-up
measurements must have met the SD criteria at least once after study entry at a
minimum interval (in general, not less than 6-8 weeks) that is defined in the study
protocol.
Each eligible patient is classified either ‘responsive’ or ‘non-responsive’ according
to CA-125 serum level and the RECIST criteria (only CR and PR are classified
as ‘responsive’). Tab. 5.2 on the next page summarizes the clinical trial responses
as assessed by the PMH group (Welsch, Wang, Gunawan, Mackay, Nathwani, Yau,
Tsang, MacAlpine, Sivaloganathan, and Oza, Welsch et al.). These are the data



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The purpose of this section is to analyze whether or not CA-125 responses are
in concordance with the objective tumor measurements of the longest diameter
in four clinical trial groups. The two classifications are in concordance if CA-
125 serum level indicates ‘response’ and the RECIST criteria based on the longest
diameter indicate ‘complete response (CR)’ or ‘partial response (PR)’. Thus, the
concordance we are talking about here is not the straight-forward measure given
by the covariance of the two parameters (which involves the entire data set), but
rather, it is what we called “medical concordance” in the last section of chapter
four, namely the one which only uses the subset of the data satisfying prescribed
“thresholds”.
As we did in the case of CAIX staining and the direct pO2 measurements,
we hypothesize that the plausibility that the concordance between the RECIST
response and the CA-125 response is quantified by H ∈ [0, 1]. If H = 0, then both
CA-125 and the objective tumor measure are in perfect discordance; whereas, if
H = 1, then they are in perfect concordance. As usual, by the application of the
Bayes’ theorem, we have
P (H|{data}, I) ∝ P ({data}|H, I) P (H|I), (5.3)
where I denotes our background information, for instance, the two responses (CA-
125 and RECIST) are independent of each other and the outcome of one patient
shall not influence that of another. The direct probability of obtaining the data ‘r
agreements; i.e., both criteria indicate response due to the administered MTA(s) in
a clinical trial group of a size N ’ follows a binomial distribution:
P ({data}|H, I) ∝ Hr (1−H)N−r. (5.4)
When we have no prior knowledge about the concordance, we may use the
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uniform prior probability for H. For illustration purpose, we also include two other
prior probabilities: One prior is peaked at H = 0.5, reflecting an approximately
50% concordance, and the other alternative prior is sharply peaked at H = 0 and
H = 1, indicating that our inference about the concordance is heavily biased toward
the ends (Fig. 5.1). Next we must assign the prior P (H|I). We have discussed at
Figure 5.1: Various prior probability assignments: Uniform prior (solid), unimodal
prior at H = 0.5 (dashed), and biased prior toward the ends (dotted)
length the importance of this assignment in the first three chapters of this Thesis.
However, some readers interested in this problem might not have the time, or the
desire, to do that extra reading; consequently, we will briefly review here the effect
of different priors for the present problem.
Consider first the case where we have no information prior to seeing the data
of Tab. 5.2. Then the most honest way of describing our ignorance is to assign
a uniform prior, i.e, to set P (H|I) = constant. Graphically, this distribution is
shown in Fig. 5.1 by the horizontal solid line for the case constant = 1. Next,
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we consider the case where we do have information about the values of H. For
illustration purposes, Fig. 5.1 shows two distributions for P (H|I): A Gaussian
distribution peaked at H = 0.5 (dashed line), and a biased distribution showing
great preference for the values H = 0 and H = 1 (dotted line).
We are now ready to apply the Bayesian parameter estimation algorithm with
these three priors to the data of Tab. 5.2, starting with group 19 (the leftmost table
of the figure). The number 19 is just the first two digits of the code in the first
column, and the groups representing the other three clinical trials will be identified
in the same manner.
As we did before, we will apply the sequential procedure; that is, after the
assigned priors and the likelihood function, Eq. 5.4, are used in Bayes’ theorem
Eq. 5.3 we get the posterior pdf, and this will now be used as the prior for the
second case of group 19, and so on. The evolutions of the posteriors as more data
are used shown in Fig 5.2, and the final posterior pdf’s are reproduced in the top
left panel of Fig. 5.3. The other three panels in this figure represent the final
posterior pdf’s for group 25, 37, and 41.
As it is evident in Fig. 5.2, the uniform (flat) prior and the biased priors adjust
quickly once a concordance and a discordance have been observed; these two priors
encode a large degree of ignorance about the nature of the concordance between
the two classifications. In contrast, the second prior assignment (a unimodal prior
or Gaussian prior peaked at H = 0.5) claims to be quite well-informed about the
nature of the concordance between the two classifications. As Sivia mentioned in
(Sivia, 2006), this is a ‘fair-minded’ prior; hence, it takes much more to be convinced
that the nature of the concordance is not fair compared to ignorant priors.
The biased prior yields a bimodal probability density function (Tab. 5.3); nev-
ertheless, one of the modes is much smaller than the other (at least a factor 1,000).
The bimodality of the resulting pdf can be explained in the following way: Initially,
the biased prior gives a high preference to perfect concordance and perfect discor-
















































































































Figure 5.3: The posterior probability density function for group 19 and 25 respec-
tively, as a result of different prior assignments.
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Figure 5.4: The posterior probability density function for group 37 and 41, respec-
tively, as a result of different prior assignments.
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Group Huniform Hgaussian Hbiased
19 0.92± 0.07 0.65± 0.09 0.97 ± 0.03 and 0.30± 0.05
25 0.63± 0.09 0.57± 0.07 0.79 ± 0.05 and 0.31± 0.05
37 0.67± 0.09 0.59± 0.07 0.80 ± 0.05 and 0.33± 0.05
41 1 0.65± 0.09 1 and 0.28± 0.06
Table 5.3: Summary for the best estimate of the concordances as a result of various
priors. The bold fonts denote the ones with higher probability.
prior becomes more convinced that the concordance is more preferred, pulling away
from discordance. With the uniform prior, however, we are open-minded about the
nature of the concordance; as a result, our inference about the concordance be-
tween the two classifications is not as extreme as the biased prior. In group 41, the
data show no discordance between the two classifications; that is why, the uniform
prior and the biased prior have a maximum value of probability at H = 1. The
fair-minded prior however only shifts a little to the right. Since we only have ten
eligible patients in this group, they are not large enough to significantly convince
this fair-minded prior.
The three cases above are just examples of the dependence of the posterior pdf
from the assigned prior. In the actual case, our collaborators from PMH made
available to us data from earlier clinical trials conducted in other institutions under
similar procedures and MTAs. So we were able to repeat the previous analysis for
this set of data before looking at the PMH data. Thus, we were not ignorant about
the concordance parameter, and it was possible for us to use this information and
use this pdf as the prior for the analysis of the PMH data.
With the informative prior probability assignment, our inference about the con-
cordance in each group, based on the current clinical trials changes accordingly.
Unlike in the previous cases when we do not have any information prior to observ-
ing the clinical trials’ data, informative prior assignment means that we have some
knowledge about the concordance before looking at the current data. The results of
the concordance are tabulated in Tab. 5.4 and the final posterior pdfs are displayed
in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: The posterior probability density function for group 19 and 25 respec-
tively, as a result of informative prior assignment from past experiments.
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Figure 5.6: The posterior probability density function for group 37 and 41, respec-







Table 5.4: The inferences about the concordance with informative prior from pre-
vious experiments.
5.5 A survival analysis for SD classified patients
According to the standard clinical trial’s paradigm for a relapsed study (RECIST),
SD classified patients are considered ‘non-responsive’. Many oncologists and clini-
cians have hypothesized that the administered MTA(s) may have a cytostatic effect
rather than a cytotoxic one; as a result, the effect of the MTA(s) may not be as obvi-
ous as eradicating a large number of tumor cells. In this section, we want to analyze
further on the importance of patients classified as ‘stable disease’ (SD). In order to
validate the hypothesis, we dichotomize all SD patients into two groups: CA-125
responders (19 patients) and CA-125 non-responders (49 patients). A common ap-
proach used in the statistical community is computing the survival probability in
each group of patients using the Kaplan-Meier estimates.
The Kaplan-Meier statistic is a function used to define a survival probability
for a period of time. Specific to the Kaplan-Meier statistic is that the intervals are
defined by the observed events (in our case, when death occurs); a new interval
would be demarcated each time a mortality occurs.The Kaplan-Meier statistic is a
generalization of the fixed time interval method, which is also known as Berkson-
Gage method (Feinstein, 2002). Tab. 5.5 and 5.6 summarize the Kaplan-Meier
estimates for each of the two groups of SD patients. Fig. 5.7 is a common feature
for illustrating the survival probabilities in CA-125 responders and CA-125 non-
responders. Based on Fig. 5.7, it is evident that CA-125 responders (the blue line)
have a survival advantage compared to CA-125 non-responders. This lends the
support that the administered MTAs have a cytostatic effect rather than cytotoxic
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Cumulative Time of
survival rate death(s) Number Interval Censored
Number before that end(s) alive before Number survival before
of interval death(s) interval death(s) of deaths rate next death
(month)
1 1 8 19 1 0.9474 4
2 0.9474 9 14 1 0.9286 0
3 0.8798 10 13 1 0.9231 0
4 0.8121 11 12 1 0.9167 0
5 0.7445 13 11 1 0.9091 2
6 0.6768 14 8 2 0.7500 0
7 0.5076 15 6 1 0.8333 0
8 0.4213 17 5 1 0.8000 0
9 0.3371 18 4 1 0.7500 0
10 0.2528 21 3 1 0.6667 1
11 0.1685 27 1 0 1 0




survival rate death(s) Number Interval Censored
Number before that end(s) alive before Number survival before
of interval death(s) interval death(s) of deaths rate next death
(month)
1 1 3 44 2 0.9545 9
2 0.9545 4 33 2 0.9394 3
3 0.8967 5 28 5 0.8214 1
4 0.7365 6 22 1 0.9545 1
5 0.7030 7 20 1 0.9500 0
6 0.6679 19 2 2 0.8950 1
7 0.5978 9 16 1 0.9375 0
8 0.5604 10 15 2 0.8667 1
9 0.4857 11 12 1 0.9167 0
10 0.4552 12 11 1 0.9091 0
11 0.4047 13 10 1 0.9000 1
12 0.3642 14 8 1 0.8750 1
13 0.3187 15 6 2 0.6667 0
14 0.2125 16 4 1 0.7500 0
15 0.1594 20 3 1 0.6667 1
16 0.1063 24 1 1 0.9583 0
Table 5.6: The Kaplan-Meier survival rates for CA-125 non-responders
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Data analysis is a crucial component of Science and Engineering, but the collection
of reliable data is in turn importantly dependent on advanced technology. That is,
perhaps, the main reason why for several millennia, Medicine has been considered
more of an art than a science. In the last century, however, advances in technol-
ogy have resulted in quite sophisticated instruments which have allowed medical
researchers to collect reams of data in all areas of medicine. Two examples of such
instruments, important in the area of oncology, are the Eppendorf polarographic
electrode and the CAIX immunohistochemical assay, which are used in the assess-
ment of hypoxia levels in tumors as explained in chapter four.
The second aspect of data analysis has to do with the methods used, which
are necessarily highly mathematical. This has traditionally represented an obstacle
for medical researchers who have only a passing knowledge of higher mathematics.
The standard solution of the conundrum is for the doctor to pass on the data set
to the statistician, who does the actual analysis and passes on the results back to
the doctor. Although this “team-work” is a practical necessity, given the extremely
complicated systems one deals with in biological settings, it is also fraught with
danger for two reasons. On the one hand, the statistician (usually a conventional
one) may not be knowledgeable enough to appreciate the medical background, and
on the other, the doctor may misinterpret the statistical results and make clinical
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decisions that may be harmful to the patient.
The danger of misinterpretation is pointed out with force by Steven Goodman
when doctors have to deal with a P-value:
“In my experience teaching many academic physicians, when physicians
are presented with a single-sentence summary of a study that produced
a surprising result with P=0.05, the overwhelming majority will con-
fidently state that there is a 95% or greater chance that the null hy-
pothesis is incorrect. This is an understandable but categorically wrong
interpretation because P-value is calculated on the assumption that the
null hypothesis is correct. It cannot, therefore, be a direct measure of
the probability that the null hypothesis is false.” (Goodman, 1999)
This logical error reinforces the mistaken belief that the data alone can tell us the
probability that a hypothesis is true. In other words, this type of interpretation
of a P-value is an attempt to make inferences from the data without using Bayes’
theorem, because the latter requires the use of a prior probability as we already
saw in chapter one of this Thesis. Numerous authors have tried to correct this mis-
understanding (Browner and Newman, 1987; Diamond and Forrester, 1983; Lilford
and Braunholtz, 1996) but the error is still widespread in the medical literature,
so much that almost no papers reporting the analysis of medical data are accepted
for publication without a P-value.
The misunderstanding and the confusion are further increased by the joining of
the P-value with Hypothesis Testing. The latter method was introduced long ago
by (Neyman and Pearson, 1933) as an answer to the inappropriateness of Fisher’s
P-value to the development of an inferential method without Bayes’ theorem. In
their hypothesis test, one poses two hypotheses about nature: a null hypothesis Ho
and an alternative hypothesis Ha. The outcome of the test is a behavior, not an
inference, namely to reject one hypothesis and accept the other exclusively on the
basis of the data. This puts the researcher at risk for two types of errors; that is -
in the case of comparing two therapies, for example - behaving as though the two
therapies differ when they are actually the same (false positive result, a type I error
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or an α error), or concluding that they are the same when in fact, they differ (false
negative result, a type II error or a β error).
This approach is appealing to the mathematician because if we assume an un-
derlying truth, then the chances of these errors can be calculated deductively, and
therefore, “objectively”. Nevertheless, as a model for scientific practice, it is prob-
lematic, to say the least. These authors recognized that their method represented
a drastic change in the way scientific conclusions must be drawn. In their words:
“ ... no test based upon a theory of probability can itself provide any
valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of a hypothesis. But we
may look at the purpose of a test from another viewpoint. Without
hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true or false, we
may search for rules to govern our behavior with regard to them, in
following which we insure that, in the long-run of experience, we shall
not often be wrong.” (Neyman and Pearson, 1933)
As pointed out by Goodman (1999), this passage clearly states the price that must
be paid for “objectivity”: We must abandon our ability to measure evidence, or
judge truth, in an individual experiment.
“Hypothesis tests are equivalent to a system of justice that is not con-
cerned with which individual defendant is found guilty or innocent (that
is, whether each separate hypothesis is true or false) but tries instead to
control the overall number of incorrect verdicts (that is, in the long-run
of experience, we shall not often be wrong).” (Goodman, 1999)
In practice, the Neyman and Pearson method means that the researcher’s duty
is to report only whether or not the results are statistically significant and act in
accordance with that verdict. This is often held up as a paradigm of the scientific
method.
Notwithstanding the explicit words of Neyman and Pearson cited above, it ap-
peared to many that if the P-value were used in the hypothesis testing procedure
then the drawbacks of the method would be eliminated. Thus, in the medical area
(and not only there), the researchers proceed as follows: An experiment is designed
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to control the probabilities of two types of “error”, namely type I error (α, usually
equal to 0.05) and type II error (β, usually less than 0.20). When the data are
obtained, a P-value is calculated and used as a quantitative measure of evidence
against Ho. If P< α, then the result is declared “significant” and Ho is regarded as
unlikely to be true.
The reason why this procedure appears appealing is due to the superficial simi-
larity of the P-value and the false positive error rate α. Both are tail-area probabil-
ities under the null hypothesis Ho. Because of this similarity, it is easy to identify
P as a special case of α, specific to the data at hand. Additionally, using Fisher’s
contention that P-value measures how severely Ho is contradicted by the data -
that is, it could serve as a measure against Ho - we have an index (P ) that does
double duty: It seems to be a Neyman-Pearson data specific, false positive error
rate and a Fisher measure of evidence against Ho (Royall, 1997; Goodman, 1993;
Fisher, 1973).
Thus, this approach is based on the fallacy that an event can be viewed simul-
taneously both from a long-run and a short-run perspective.
“In the ‘long-run’ perspective, which is error-based and deductive, we
group the observed result together with other outcomes that might have
occurred in hypothetical repetitions of the experiments. In the ‘short-
run’ perspective, which is evidential and inductive, we try to evaluate
the meaning of the observed result from a single experiment. If we could
combine these perspectives, it would mean that inductive ends (drawing
scientific conclusions) could be served with purely deductive methods
(objective probability calculations).” (Goodman, 1999)
But these views cannot be reconciled because a given result (the short-run)
can legitimately be included in many different long-runs. Equivalently, a result
cannot be at the same time be an anonymous member of a group of results (the
long-run view) and an identifiable (i.e., unique) member (the short-run view). A
real-world example helps clarifying this. Suppose we examine the meaning of the
statement that “a result with P=0.05 is in a group of outcomes that has 5% chance
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of occurring under Ho”. Although that is literally the case, we know that the result
is not just in that group (that is, anonymous); we know where it is (that is, it is
identifiable). As an analogy, we can consider the following statement,
“... a student who ranks 10 out of 100 is in the top 10% of the class ...
Although literally true, [this statement is] deceptive because [it suggests]
that a student could be anywhere in a top fraction when we know he or
she is at the lowest level of that group.” (Goodman, 1999)
In contrast to this state of affairs, the Bayesian approach adopted in this Thesis
is completely straight-forward. The philosophical differences have been pointed out
in chapter one, and the contributions of the ‘founding fathers’ have been reviewed
in chapter two. We recognize from the start that scientific reasoning is inductive,
which means that we must make appropriate assessments of the uncertainty nec-
essarily produced by the measuring apparatus. It follows that measurements and
inferences have to be described as probability distributions.
Consider a measuring apparatus which is designed to let the experimenter in-
vestigate some unknown features X = {X1, X2, ...} of observed samples. Regret-
tably, equipment seldom measures X directly or in full. Instead, it produces data
D = {d1, d2, ...} which may depend on X in a complicated way. Also, repeated ob-
servations even on the same sample usually produce different data because of noise.
Supposing there exists a functional form (or a model of it) D = R(x), which we
can call the “response function” of the equipment, these data will vary according
to some probability distribution
P (D|X, I) = likelihood function,
where, as usual, the vertical bar denotes conditioning and I stands for “background
information”. Usually, we suppose that noise (denoted by σ) is additive so that we
can write
D = R(x)± σ,
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and that the additive noise has a Gaussian pdf, in which case we have the explicit
formula (for the likelihood function)














Once we have the likelihood function, we know what the data mean, and so we can
realistically aim to infer the values of the unknown quantities X. Such inference
will be uncertain; hence, we can at best aim for the posterior pdf
P (X|D, I) = inference,
This involves inverting the assigned likelihood, but the inversion requires us to
assign a prior pdf
P (X|I) = prior,
which represents our guess, or preconception, about the range of the unknown
values that might be present before we see the data. As seen in chapter two and
three, it is the Bayes’ theorem which effects the inversion.
We have applied in chapter four this methodology to the analysis of CAIX stain-
ing and pO2 measurements on the data collected by the PMH group, and analyzed
by them with the methods of conventional (frequentist) statistics. Throughout the
analysis, the simplifying assumption of tumor homogeneity was made, and as a
result we were able to estimate the minimum number of biopsies capable of giving
an estimate of the amount of hypoxia in the entire tumor - something not easily
done by conventional methods.
But even more interesting are the results reported in Section 4.4 concerning the
question of whether or not a positive correlation exists between the CAIX assess-
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ment of hypoxia and the Eppendorf probe assessment. Finding such a correlation
is an important goal for oncological research, in that it would replace the Eppen-
dorf polarographic electrode which is far more cumbersome and subject to large
fluctuations in the measurement of oxygen tension. Calculations of this potential
correlation is published so far were done using only conventional techniques, and
little, or at most moderate, correlation was found. We have estimated this correla-
tion in Section 4.4 using the entire data set, and found zero correlation. We then
repeated the calculation with a manipulated set of data, which was the same set
used by our collaborators at PMH. They used conventional statistics and reported
their results in the following form: “Pearson = 0.30, Spearman = 0.35, P = 0.091”
(Iakovlev et al., 2007). With our Bayesian approach we found a much higher value,
namely 0.67.
In our opinion, this result should be taken with great caution because of the
manipulation of the data. One of the merits of Bayesian methods is that it gives
the most honest inference from a given data set, provided the full data set and only
monotonic transformations are used. This is not always the case in the frequentist




where CAIX is the original proportion and caix is the transformed value in order
to “stabilize the variance of the residuals”.
Finally, in chapter five, we report on the Bayesian analysis of an unrelated set
of data, namely data from phase II clinical trials of relapsed ovarian cancers. Here
as well the underlying assumptions are such that the Bayesian calculations are
completely straight-forward, and the results are currently being incorporated in a
paper jointly with our medical collaborators (Welsch, Wang, Gunawan, Mackay,
Nathwani, Yau, Tsang, MacAlpine, Sivaloganathan, and Oza, Welsch et al.).
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Appendix A
A brief overview of Monte Carlo
integration
Monte Carlo simulation is a vast area of research; here, we provide a brief overview






Suppose we can find a random variable y with support in D such that





g(y) p(y) dy =< g >, (A.3)
where < g > denotes the expectation of g, then assuming the random variable is





















where θ = 0.418 (Hammersley and Handscomb, 1964). For five iterations, the crude







therefore, θ ≈ θ̂. This is an example of crude Monte Carlo method; there are
various other Monte Carlo methods for definite integration, namely, hit-and-miss
Monte Carlo, or Monte Carlo with importance sampling, leading to the development
of more sophisticated techniques such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). We
should keep in mind that unlike deterministic numerical integrations, there is no rule
of convergence in Monte Carlo methods and they may have long ‘burn-in’ time for a
high dimensional integration; consequently, we must be cautious in interpreting the
results. There are numerous review resources for Monte Carlo methods; however,
(Hammersley and Handscomb, 1964) is a good resource for the fundamentals of
Monte Carlo methods and (Gentle, 2003) is detailed resource about various types




When we use a Gaussian distribution with an unknown standard deviation s for
our prior probability of the noise, we obtain the following form for our posterior
pdf (after integration and uniform prior assignment)
P (Y |D, I) ∝ 1(∑N




where Y is our parameter of interest and N is the total data points. It is the well-
known Student-t distribution after some simple simplifications in the denominator,
N∑
i=1
(di − Y )2 =
N∑
i=1














where d̄ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 di, the sample mean. We proceed by completing the square in
the first factor on the right-hand side, and adding and subtracting Nd̄2,
N∑
i=1























We complete the square again on the last two factors on the right-hand side,
N∑
i=1
(di − Y )2 = N(Y − d̄)2 + Nd̄2 +
N∑
i=1
(di − d̄)2 −Nd̄2,




where often we write V =
∑N
i=1(di−d̄)2. Finally, the posterior pdf has the following
form
P (Y |D, I) ∝ 1(




which is known as a Student-t distribution with N − 1 degrees of freedom. When
N = 2, this probability density function is also known as the Cauchy distribution.
It has a maximum is at Y = d̄, a full width at half maximum (FWHM) proportional
to
√




In chapter four and five of this Thesis, we saw some applications of Bayesian data
analysis in cancer research. The analyses presented in those chapters fall under
the category parameter estimation because we estimate the parameter based on
an assumed functional model (CAIX-positive cells are constant within a tumor, in
chapter 4). In cases where we do not know the exact functional model but we may
have some reasons to restrict the functional model into a class of functions, we may
use a model selection procedure, i.e, when we want to determine the number of
exponential models present in the data as in (Sivia, 2006; Bretthorst et al., 2005).
A much harder case is where we cannot characterize the functional model at all;
we do not know about the physics of the problem and have no confidence to assume
the distribution has a simple form (Sivia, 2006). This type of problems falls under
the class of “non-parametric” or “free-form” estimation. In many experiments, we
may need to compare samples of data from a probability whose density function
(pdf) is unknown. For example, estimating the CAIX-positive cells’ distribution in
a tumor from a sample. As we mentioned earlier, we do not yet know about the
physics of CAIX protein to be able to predict the theoretical form of the distribution
and we have no reason to assume the distribution has some simple form, such as
Gaussian.
Although this type of problem is also encountered in the classical method (Ar-
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mitage et al., 2002; Wadsworth, 1997), we will proceed with the Bayesian approach
as first proposed by Gull and Fielden (1984). In the Bayesian framework, we make
only minimal assumptions about the nature of the underlying pdf (Gull and Fielden,
1984). For illustration purposes, we follow the procedures for estimating the posi-
tion of a quantile (i.e., the median of a pdf not the sample) is outlined as follows
(Gull and Fielden, 1984).
Suppose that we have N samples, {xi}, taken from a certain pdf P (x), where








because median position at x means that the area under the probability density
function to the left of x and to the right of x is equal. Then, using the Bayes’
theorem, we obtain the posterior probability density function (pdf) for Mx,
P (Mx|{xi}, I) ∝ P (Mx|I)× P ({xi}|Mx, I). (C.2)
The proposition Mx (for different x) are exclusive and exhaustive, since the median
certainly lies in [a, b]. We therefore take the prior P (Mx|I) to be uniform for all
x in this interval. Unlike in the earlier cases, the likelihood P ({xi}|Mx, I) is not
uniquely determined by the position of the median.The proposition Mx however
constitutes testable information about P (x); i.e, given any P (x), we decide imme-
diately whether it is consistent with information Mx. Furthermore, if the samples
are exchangeable, then Mx is testable information about the joint pdf P ({xi});
thus, we shall seek a pdf that incorporates information available, yet is maximally
non-committal about other parameters of the distribution. We shall use Maximum
Entropy (MaxEnt) principle under the constraint Mx; we maximize
S = −
∫







subject to normalization condition,
∫
dNx P ({xi}) = 1, (C.4)
and the position of the median,
∫ x
a




because the integral is N -dimensional, rather than writing many integral notations,
we use the notation commonly used in the physics literature. For one sample, x′,
and a uniform prior in [a, b], the solution has a simple form:
P (x′|Mx, I) =
 12(x−a) , for x′ < x1
2(b−x) , for x
′ > x.
(C.6)
As an example consider x′ = 0.75, a = 0, and b = 1, the likelihood is
P (0.75|Mx, I) =
 12(x−0) , for 0.75 < x1
2(1−x) , for 0.75 > x.
(C.7)
Using Bayes’ theorem, P (Mx|0.75, I) ∝ P (0.75|Mx, I); hence, for the posterior pdf,
we can view Eq. C.7 as a function of x. Fig C.1 displays the result for one-sample
posterior pdf for the median position Mx.
For multiple, exchangeable samples, the MaxEnt distribution is necessarily in-
dependent because the constraints all take the form of separate equalities on each
of the marginal distributions. We find the likelihood to have the following form:









where N < and N > are the number of data points xi < x amd xi > x respectively.
The posterior pdf is proportional to C.8 but viewed as a function of x. In this
case, we wish to estimate, from a certain sample of size N , the position of the
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Figure C.1: The posterior pdfs for the position of median for one-sample set. The
pdf is normalized vertically so that the maximum height is unity.
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Figure C.2: The posterior pdfs for the position of median for 39 samples uniformly
distributed between -1 and 1. The pdf is normalized vertically so that the maximum
height is unity.
median making only minimal assumptions about the form of the distribution. Note
that we are not claiming that the MaxEnt distribution for some x is in fact the
underlying pdf. To illustrate this in practice, let us follow the example provided in
(Gull and Fielden, 1984): determining the position of the median of the pdf based
on 39 samples uniformly spaced between -1 and 1, with a prior range of [−1.5, 1.5].
Fig. C.2 illustrates the posterior pdf of Mx, the position of the median.
An interesting feature about this problem is that the effect of the prior range is
still apparent. Fig. C.3 shows the posterior pdf for the same sample with a prior
range [−1.5, 1.5], [−3, 3], and [−5, 5] respectively. As it is evident, the distribution
gets wider as the prior range is increased, but not proportionally. This is reasonable
when we consider how little has been assumed about the distribution (Gull and
Fielden, 1984). In this example, we specifically designed the sample to be uniformly
spaced between [−1, 1]; thus, the resulting pdf is symmetric and unimodal, aside
113
Figure C.3: The posterior pdfs for the position of median for 39 samples uniformly
distributed between -1 and 1 with different prior ranges.
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Figure C.4: The posterior pdfs for the position of median for 600 samples uniformly
distributed between -1 and 1.
from the discontinuities at the sample points. The best estimate of the position
of the median is the value which yields the maximum and the uncertainty of the
estimate is simply the full width at half maximum of pdf.
As we notice from the figures, the posterior pdf has an unusual characteristic,
namely discontinuities at the sample points. If we have many more sample points
(i.e, 600 points uniformly spaced within [−1, 1]), then the discontinuities will be
unnoticeable (Fig. C.4). Although many have attempted in considerable length to
explain this phenomenon, it is not necessary; as mentioned in (Gull and Fielden,
1984), “it is the job of a pdf to tell us how much probability falls into any interval
x, hence it must certainly be integrable”. There is no requirement that pdf has to
be a continuous one.
In real experimental data however, there is no guarantee for the symmetric and
unimodal pdf. As an example, let us consider the CAIX data from the first and
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second set, respectively (Fig. C.5). The best estimate of the median in patient
2144’s data can be inferred quite reliably (Fig. C.5, left). The same conclusion
cannot be said for patient 2149’s data due to their multimodality.
As a final note, in the CA-125 project, the PMH group is interested in de-
termining the median survival times for two different classes of ‘SD’ classified
patients: CA-125 responders and CA-125 non-responders in order to investigate
the importance of CA-125 serum marker. As it is mentioned in (Welsch, Wang,
Gunawan, Mackay, Nathwani, Yau, Tsang, MacAlpine, Sivaloganathan, and Oza,
Welsch et al.), the molecularly-targeted agents (MTAs) may have cytostatic effects
rather than cytotoxic ones; consequently, the administered MTAs may be effective
in SD classified patients and CA-125 serum marker is the diagnostic tool to show
the effectiveness of the MTAs in these clinical trials. Fig. C.6 shows the posterior
pdf for the median survival times for CA-125 responders (black line) and CA-125
non-responders (red line). Even though we see that the posterior pdf of CA-125
responders is located to the right of the posterior pdf of CA-125 non-responders,
the width of the pdf of CA-125 responders and the multimodality of the pdf of
CA-125 non-responders warn us that we should not jump to conclusions based on
these data.
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Figure C.5: The posterior pdfs for the position of median. Left: patient 2144 (from
the first data set). Right: patient 2149 (from the second data set)
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Figure C.6: The posterior pdfs for median survival times in SD classified patients.
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